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Abstract
As technology continues to advance the domain of cyber defense, signature and
heuristic detection mechanisms continue to require human operators to make judgements
about the correctness of machine decisions. Human cyber defense operators rely on their
experience, expertise, and understanding of network security, when conducting cyberbased investigations, in order to detect and respond to cyber alerts. Ever growing
quantities of cyber alerts and network traffic, coupled with systemic manpower issues,
mean no one has the time to review or change decisions made by operators. Since these
cyber alert decisions ultimately do not get reviewed again, an inaccurate decision could
cause grave damage to the network and host systems. The Cyber Intruder Alert Testbed
(CIAT), a synthetic task environment (STE), was expanded to include investigative
pattern of behavior monitoring and confidence reporting capabilities [1]. By analyzing
the behavior and confidence of participants while they conducted cyber-based
investigations, this research was able to identify a mapping between investigative patterns
of behavior and decision confidence. The total time spent on a decision, the time spent
using different investigative tools, and total number of tool transitions, were all factors
which influenced the reported confidence of participants when conducting cyber-based
investigations.
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ESTIMATING DEFENSIVE CYBER OPERATOR DECISION CONFIDENCE
I.
1.1

Introduction

General Issue/Motivation
Cyber operators, the colloquial term for humans engaged in cyber defense

activities on the Air Force Enterprise Network, are tasked with making judgements and
decisions about the correctness of machine decisions, including how to remedy network or
host-based threats. For the purposes of this research, only network-based threats are of
importance, as they must be delivered over a monitored and defended network to a target
machine. The Cyber Intruder Alert Testbed (CIAT) synthetic task environment (STE)
mimics a real-world security information and event management (SIEM) system, allowing
for cyber-based alerts to be displayed and analyzed by the user [1]. Human operators
interact with the system by identifying, validating, and tracking network-based security
threats to the network. Thus, operations and training require humans to excel in the
understanding of their task, such that they can make informed and correct decisions even
if the tools and sensors may not always be correct. Typically it takes 6-12 months to
become comfortable and confident on these weapons systems based on personal subjective
levels of analysis. Once a human is certified on a system, they must maintain currency and
proficiency on a month-to-month basis with yearly evaluations to ensure they are properly
prepared to handle their job requirements. A "one size fits all" method of training is not
necessarily tailored to individual operator’s areas needing improvement, so those lacking
in experience or confidence in select areas may or may not receive the most effective
training regimen. It is impractical, if not impossible, to prepare these cyber operators for
1

every task or scenario they may encounter, thus they will have to rely on their own
independent reasoning and problem solving skills based on their training and experience.
The investigative process for each alert is dependent on the information available and the
operator’s expertise and experience. These investigations ultimately lead to the operator
making a decision with some level of confidence. The level of decision confidence may be
measured using behavioral indicators, subjective indicators, and even electrophysiological
indicators. Decision confidence, defined by Insabato et al., is the feeling of having done
something correctly or incorrectly, which is an important aspect of subject experience
during decision-making as this increases for correct decisions and decreases for error
decisions [2]. With the ability to identify cyber operators in low confidence situations,
they can be augmented with increased attentiveness by other cyber operators, which in
effect would be a tailored and specific usage of quality control to improve operations.
Additionally, these low confidence situations, if detectable, would allow for tailored
training to remedy these otherwise lower confidence situations. In worst case scenarios,
trends may be established to identify when a cyber operator is in their normal state of
decision confidence, be it normally high or low, and flag or alert the operator to decisions
made outside their normal threshold.
1.2

Problem Statement
By observing the behavior and estimating the decision confidence of human

subjects while they make decisions in a cyber-defense task environment, we may be able
to identify when an operator needs assistance. Assistance may then be provided in the
form of investigation review, training, and operational work using the new decision
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confidence information. Using machine learning-based behavior pattern classifications,
we may be able to map changes in confidence levels to address variations in tool
compatibility, analyst skillsets or experience, and workload.
Previous human research in decision confidence has primarily focused on interview and
survey type experiments where participants were asked to self-assess their decision
confidence. The objective is to expand on past human research into decision confidence,
specifically in the domain of cyber-defense, by observing the operator’s investigative
patterns of behavior. Decision confidence will be estimated using decision performance
measures such as time to decision, accuracy/correctness, and the participant’s self-reported
confidence. Physiological data will be recorded from electroencephalogram (EEG),
electrocardiogram (ECG), and electrooculography (EOG) equipment, for association with
mental and physical behaviors related to decision confidence. The behavior observed
while participants investigate cyber-alerts in the CIAT STE will carry over to real-world
cyber-based alert investigations, as the environment and tools resemble what cyberdefense analysts would use. Understanding the investigative patterns of behavior and
estimating decision confidence will lead to a better understanding of how decisions are
made.
1.3

Research Questions/Hypotheses

RQ1: What does the pattern of behavior, exhibited while investigating an event, tell us
about operator confidence in the formulation of a decision?
Hypothesis: Investigative behavior has an effect on operator confidence.

3

RQ2: What investigative and evidence collection techniques does the operator use to make
a decision?
Hypothesis: Differences in decision confidence will be evident in both patterns of
investigative behavior and differences in the operator’s electrophysiology.
RQ3: What are the behavior patterns associated with a confident decision?
Hypothesis: Operator behavior patterns associated with higher confidence will be
reflected in faster decision-making and quantifiable electrophysiological metrics.
RQ4: What are the behavior patterns associated with a correct and confident decision?
Hypothesis: Operator behavior patterns associated with high confidence and
correct decision selection, will exhibit electrophysiological metrics which are
quantifiably different from decisions made in lower confidence.
1.4

Research Focus
The focus of this research is to estimate decision confidence during a cyber defense

investigation. While investigating the effect of alert difficulty on the investigative patterns
of behavior, decision confidence will be determined by mapping the patterns of behavior
to self-reported factors and recorded physiological information. If the investigative
workflow and behavior patterns can be mapped to known electrophysiological indicators
of the formulation of a decision and the associated decision confidence, then the more
readily available non-physiological measurements can be used to estimate human decision
confidence in order to provide feedback for efficiency and performance enhancement.

4

1.5

Methodology
The methodology is composed of three distinct parts, because each portion allows

for observations which can then be identified and correlated across the other parts in order
to model the formulation of a decision. Collecting self-reported confidence scores for each
investigation is the easiest to obtain and review, thus it will be the first focus.
The self-reported confidence scoring was done by presenting the participant’s with
Likert scales. Likert-type scales are frequently used in medical education research and
clinical studies to measure self-reported data such as anxiety or self-confidence [3], [4].
The typical Likert scale is a 5- or 7- point ordinal scale used by respondents to rate the
degree to which they agree or disagree with a statement [3], [5]. The reason a Likert-type
scale was selected was to benefit from the ordinal scale. A 3-point ordinal scale of “not
confident”, “somewhat confident”, and “very confident” was created. An ordinal scale
allowed for distinct answer choices, but made comparing raw values difficult since the
scale is not necessarily equidistant. The Likert-type scale used in this experiment was set
to a scale of 0-100 values, using 3 subjective anchor words. The CIAT STE would display
the Likert scale to the participant during each cyber-alert investigation. After a certain
amount of alerts, the participant would be asked to rank the alerts, in order from top-tobottom, as highest-to-lowest confidence, respectively. This ordering task forces any ties to
be broken, should any of the alerts have identical Likert scale values. The numeric
confidence scores are not available to the participant while they complete this ordering
task. Since the participants will not have access to their confidence scores, they will have
to rely on their notes and short-term memory. The ordering task acts as a validation
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control, ensuring the participants understood the confidence scores and the relation of
alerts when comparing them to each other.
The second method is a behavioral analysis, made possible by observing and
analyzing the workflow of each investigative and decision-making choice. Behavioral
analysis involves recording the timing and value of every mouse click and keyboard input.
By cataloging and reconstructing this data, a workflow and timeline can be generated for
each participant. This workflow will replay the investigation of every alert, including
every tool accessed and how long each tool was accessed. In addition, the recorded
workflow can identify when tools were skipped or avoided. Skipping or avoiding tools
could suggest learning effects or mistakes, dependent on other behavioral features. The
intent of the behavioral analysis is to determine whether certain actions cause changes to
confidence when reviewing the accuracy of alerts.
The final method to investigate is the relationships of the previous two methods
with the participant’s physiological measurements. Various sensors will record the
electrophysiological activity of each participant as they complete the cyber-alert
investigations. Similar to patterns of behavior, the physiology of each participant will
allow for an analysis of the evidence accumulation process when conducting the cyberalert investigations. Additionally, certain physiological patterns manifest during decisionmaking, dependent on confidence [2].

6

1.6

Assumptions and Limitations

1.6.1

Assumptions
All of these methods are susceptible to the learning effect. The learning effect

explains accelerated improvement to new or unfamiliar tasks, which would otherwise be
negligible if someone was experienced with a task. All participants, especially those
without any formal cyber security experience, will be learning and improving their cyber
alert investigation process during the experiment. Because human subjects continuously
absorb information about their surroundings, they cannot be expected to treat each alert as
independent. Tool and process familiarity must be accounted for outside of the
experiment, in order to minimize the effects of workflow improvement during the
experiment. Therefore, a 2-hour training phase was created to reduce the learning effect
for participants. The training phase involved interface and tool familiarization, as well as a
hands-on tutorial with a step-by-step investigation walkthrough using several example
alerts. The training phase also included a complete round of alerts, where participants
were allowed to practice without assistance. The assumption is that the participant will
know enough about how to conduct a cyber-based investigation and make a decision
based on the evidence they collect. The 2-hour training phase occurred prior to the
experiment. Participant selection assumed that participants would understand how to
operate a computer, and be willing to undergo training in order to understand and practice
the cyber-alert investigative process.
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1.6.2

Limitations
Participants were recruited from students, faculty, and staff of the Air Force

Institute of Technology. Because the backgrounds of participants in this experiment may
be different from the background of a typical cyber operator, it may be necessary to
conduct additional experiments to validate whether the findings are similar for participants
with a background in cyber security who are more familiar with cyber security tools and
concepts.
The CIAT STE uses one computer screen, meaning that all of the options and
actions available to the participant were presented all at once. The STE differs from realworld scenarios and situations, in that all of the tools are available in one display window
and in one location. Real-world systems typically require multiple tools, systems, and
computer monitors in order to access relevant information while conducting a cyber-based
investigation. In order to eliminate additional timing factors, such as window switching
between tools, the design choice of one main window with all tools and alert information
was made. Because the tools and interface were only on one screen, as the experiment’s
results are limited to environments with similar limitations. The modular nature of this
STE allows for relatively easy changes to be made to mimic other capabilities or tools, if
that becomes the focus of future research.
1.7

Contributions
This study refines other work on cyber decision-making and decision confidence,

with the inclusion of physiological measurements. In addition, the cyber-defense focus on
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the patterns of behavior provides empirical evidence of otherwise subjective
measurements for decision-making and decision confidence.
Although more analysis is necessary, especially in the realm of EEG, the patterns
of behavior deduced from the trove of user-provided mouse clicks and keyboard input
suggests that certain activity is repeated throughout the investigative process, up to and
including when a decision is made. The usage of tools, and the order at which they were
used, provides key insight into the workflow and process each participant uses when
gathering information to make an informed decision. The participant’s tendency to
alternate between tools, time on a tool, and creation of notes indicates a degree of
confidence which may be isolated and compared between participants and across one
participant’s completion of 30 alerts. Furthermore, consistency in the participant’s
subjective decision confidence and the experiment’s estimated alert difficulty, as well as
the average time to complete each investigation and selection of a decision, enables
various data features to be analyzed and compared across participants, ensuring the
consistency and validity of the intended alert difficulty.
1.8

Preview
The rest of the document will be divided into four chapters. In Chapter II, the

Literature Review will define several definitions and concepts which led to the
formulation of this research. The Literature Review identifies gaps in understanding the
investigative decision-making process and decision confidence in cyber defense. Chapter
III greatly expands upon the methodology and intricacies specific to the setup and creation
of the experiment. Chapter IV will describe the compilation and analysis of the data
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recorded from the experiment, and present the results. Finally, Chapter V will conclude
with a discussion of the results and recommendations for future work.
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II.

2.1

Literature Review

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a synopsis of the known research in the

area of cyber defense decision-making. Computer science concepts, relationships, and
psychology ideas relevant to the pursuit of this research, will be defined. The major
themes of decision-making research are confidence, certitude, and self-confidence. With
an understanding of the previously completed work in the realm of cyber defense, the
reasons behind the pursuit of researching cyber defense decision confidence should
become clear.
2.2

Definitions, Themes, and Concepts
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines confidence as a feeling or consciousness

of one’s powers or of reliance on one’s circumstances [6]. In the field of cyber defense,
analysts and operators rely on their computer systems and skill, in order to make
decisions. These decisions may be confined by information availability and the time
remaining to make a decision. The feeling of confidence is subjective. Feelings cannot
accurately be captured within the bounds of numerical measurements, and feelings can
change spontaneously.
Decision confidence describes how confident a person feels when considering how
they feel about their decision. Confidence is difficult to measure if the information
available to make the decision, or if the scale used to represent the measuring of
confidence, is misunderstood. Therefore a measuring scale for decision-making tasks,
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which can record confidence, is required. This scale is known as a decision self-efficacy
scale [7].
Self-efficacy is confidence in one’s ability to achieve an intended result [8]. The
process leading to the result must be scrutinized for validity, as various effects of bias can
corrupt the decision-making process. Bias describes a person’s tendency to view
something from a particular perspective. Biases may prevent or impede a person from
being objective and impartial [9].
Several key biases, which this research needs to be aware of during the
experimentation process, will be highlighted in this chapter. Biases, with respect to a
participant’s decision-making could lead to greatly skewed results. For example, the way
in which information is presented to participants could prime or bias them towards this
information should they come across it again later during the experiment. Methods for
controlling these biases will be expounded upon in the Chapter III, Methodology.
Pfleeger separates biases as status quo, framing effects, optimism, control,
confirmation, and the endowment effect [9]. Status quo is simply the resistance of an
individual to change their behavior without a reason or incentive. Feedback and
repercussions for actions can be used to address and reduce status quo biases. Framing
effects bias involves the presentation or manner in which information is presented. The
efficacy of a trial can be framed in terms of gains, rather than losses, or by appealing to
particular characteristics. This method of information presentation, e.g. ordering or words
used, can influence and dramatically affect the decision. Similar to framing effects,
priming or anchoring also leads to biases, as information presented earlier is easier to rely
on than information presented later.
12

Optimism bias is the belief that a person will perform or be presented with a higher
likelihood of positive events. This bias is an over or under estimation of the likelihood of
positive and negative events occurring. Optimism bias may, for example, induce people to
ignore preventive care measures, such as patching software, because they believe they are
unlikely to be affected [9]. Similar to the optimism bias, control bias is the tendency of
people to believe they can control or influence outcomes they clearly cannot.
Confirmation bias is the tendency of favoring or interpreting information based on
previously held “confirmed” beliefs. When looking at a situation, a person affected by
confirmation bias will tend to place a higher emphasis on confirming and aligning with
their previously held beliefs than reviewing the situation across all facets. This shortcircuit of the decision-making process can become evident due in part to the speed at
which a decision is made, or by creating situations or presenting evidence in a way to
catch those who do not review all pertinent areas of the information. The endowment
effect bias describes the fact that people usually place a higher value on objects they own
than objects they do not own [9]. This may lead people to react more strongly to a loss
than to a gain. For example, when an action is expressed as a loss of privacy, rather than a
gain in capability, people tend to act negatively.
For the pilot community, Holland and Freeman explored mishaps involving the
loss of situation awareness of F-16 pilots, and deemed the occurrences due to channelized
attention [10]. Channelized attention is similar to a confirmation bias, in that the human
subject’s focus may make them miss or completely dismiss other relevant information due
to their preconceived notion or fixation on other elements of information. Cyber defense
and piloting aircraft can involve much of the same sorts of tasks, such as accurately
13

gauging and maintaining situation awareness of the environment. Graphic user interface
(GUI) construction, specifically those involving various colors that users must react to,
can lead to channelized attention. Users may focus the majority of their time and effort on
visual information which is color coded by priority, for example, and disregard relevant
but different colored information.
Slight nuances, such as the ordering of cyber alerts, can illicit different behaviors
and responses. Network events are typically ordered from newest-to-oldest, due to how
host, network, and intrusion detection systems detect and report traffic. Investigating
traffic out of order can hide malicious payloads or cause traffic to look benign. This can be
dangerous in the cyber defense environment, because the standardization of protocols and
traffic may make many things look almost identical. An awareness of participant’s
reliance on past performance or behavior indicators for decision-making, especially when
they are new to a task, is of valid concern when reviewing participant behavior.
Outside of biases, there are other concepts that influence decision confidence, such
as choice certainty, cues to action, and situation awareness. Decisions are usually
accompanied by a degree of certainty or confidence, which reflects a graded belief about
the likelihood of different outcomes [11]. Choice certainty facilitates adaptive regulation
of behavior by furnishing a basis for learning from outcome, and supports decisionmaking in complex environments where subsequent decisions depend on the predicted
outcome of recent decisions before the actual consequences are known [12]. Cues to
action are events that trigger or remind an individual to take an action they either forgot or
were not originally intending to take, such as a reminder about the return date for a DVD
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to a service like Redbox, or an overdue library book. By using cues to action, one can
influence a user to make a decision or ignore the new information [13].
Situation awareness is a broad theme that can be applied in the cyber defense
domain [14]. Without situation awareness, it can be difficult to decide on a course of
action. If network defense actions are required, a lack of situation awareness could
drastically limit or impede the necessary network actions from taking place to contain a
threat and maintain services. Situation awareness in cyber defense ordinarily requires not
just an understanding of the local machines and environment, but the context of machines
geographically separated and isolated from the defender. This makes it difficult to assess
the problem, and this detachment from the real-world environment affects the perceived
risk-versus-reward for the operator, as they at least rarely have physical repercussions to
worry about due to a decision.
Tyworth and his colleagues assert that the greater research community tends to
focus analytical attention on new technologies instead of understanding and improving the
underlying socio-cognitive work performed by human cyber security professionals [14].
Their solution argues for distributing situation awareness across human and technological
agents, thereby re-focusing and enhancing the human-centric approach needed in cyber
defense analysis. Typically, the human resource is the hardest to recruit, train, and
maintain, thus technological solutions seem more valuable in the short-term to cover these
gaps by producing rapid and consistent data analysis. Yet, a human is involved in all
cases, either as the creator of the hardware and software solution or in-the-loop deciding
whether to follow the guidance of the technology. Humans and technology end up not
working in tandem, as the technology is still reliant on the human to program or tell it how
15

to carry out the analysis task. Technology enables the human to create or become aware of
a situation, through the use of visual or other sensory cues. Endsley’s experiments on
measuring cognitive perspective of human operator’s understanding of an environment at
a particular point in time, artificially controlled through the use of freeze-probe
measurements techniques, brought about a well-valued theory of situation awareness in
dynamic systems [15]. Tyworth suggests that the situation awareness technique proposed
by Endsley, is unable to distinguish between situation awareness based on knowledge and
experience of the operator or from the underlying technologies which support the insight
alone.
Cyber defense analysts struggle with low situation awareness due in part to the
speed and rigor they are required to categorize incoming and outgoing traffic. These
analysts may not know why something is or is not worth paying special attention to,
because of their limited situation awareness. This situation awareness gap is due in part to
policy, but mostly due to the vastness of the threat landscape which analysts are expected
to patrol. Cyber defense organizations are typically structured into separate teams or tiers,
with increasing levels providing further insight into the network through tools and
capabilities. The cyber defense analyst in this research is typically located at the lowest
level in a cyber organization, where they monitor and react to near real-time network
alerts. This lowest level is the first, and sometimes only, chance to identify and react to
potentially malicious network activity. The goal of this new research is to identify when
and how decision confidence plays a role in the formation of decisions by human analysts,
such that the correct areas can be focused on for improvement.
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The last concept, taken from behavioral science literature, is that recognition is
significantly easier than recall [9]. Cyber defenders are tasked with rapidly cataloging,
identifying, and responding to potentially malicious traffic. This visually dominated work
involves reading and surveying complex text, pictures, and numbers. Recognition tasks
should increase confidence, as there is little investigating needing to be done outside of
recalling a situation. Therefore, information representation must be uniform throughout
the interface in order to produce consistent situation awareness.
2.3

Decision-Making and Behavior
Several papers proposed strategies and models for investigating human decision-

making. Whereas one strategy involved comparing and contrasting two popular theories of
decision-making strategies, notably Long Term Working Memory (LTWM) and TakeThe-First (TTF), a significant exception was a paper which recommended the need to
account for and test whether evidence was reliable, as conjecture shows this can affect
decision-making and confidence [16], [17]. Yeung and Summerfield explore the “postdecisional locus model” and the findings on how decisions occur and what makes people
“change their mind” once a decision is cast. The drift-diffusion model illustrates decisions
as an accumulation of evidence over a period of time, until either one of two thresholds, θ
or – θ, is met or exceeded. By including the metacognitive process known as error
monitoring, humans are able to adapt both their short- and long-term actions based on
outcomes observed prior to their next decision. Mapping this to the drift-diffusion model,
future outcomes based on accumulation of evidence to the decision point of one decision
may lead a human to either maintain the decision into future situations, based no
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additional information, or instead opt to choose the other decision based on the
accumulation of time and evidence. Thus, observation and modeling of the underlying
biological components of the brain is necessary, due to the subjective and malleable
decision-making process of humans. Error monitoring seems similar, if not identical, to
the process of learning, which is of critical importance in human subject experiments, as it
is one of the many biases from which the experimental design intends to negate or
minimize the effects. Additionally, when coupled with trust, error monitoring relies on
accurate information gathering, which certain tools and systems in the experiment could
be modulated to either accurately or inaccurately provide feedback on what course of
action to take. Furthermore, a lack of feedback may also have the potential to affect the
way in which error monitoring is carried out by the human.
The two decision-making strategies proposed by Belling et al., LTWM and TTF,
are likewise of importance due to one of the biggest assumptions of this research, namely
the recruitment of human subjects who are not necessarily cyber defense experts [16]. The
LTWM theory suggests that experts rely on stored knowledge when placed in a new
environment, and the TTF heuristic relies on taking the first action that comes to mind.
Their experiment involved several trials with human-subjects, to determine whether time
and the number of options generated by participants affected participant accuracy in
prediction and response trials. The procedure involved recreational-level soccer players
viewing video clips of live soccer matches. The players were tasked to determine the next
course of action of the recorded player, when the clip ended or occluded at a critical
decision point. In the trials involving prediction, participants illustrated options for any
combination of players, actions, movements, and ball position, under the focus of being a
18

defender. In the response trials, the participant rated how likely they were to pursue each
generated course of action. Additionally, only half of the trials involved time constraints.
The results challenged the hypothesis on whether time constraints lead to increased use of
TTF strategies. Contrary to their expectations, LTWM strategies were employed when
participants were under time constraints.
Ward and colleagues reviewed decision-making strategies in various other
disciplines, conducting experiments in competitive chess gameplay [18]. The competitive
chess gameplay results pointed to no evidence of performance differences, under timeconstraints. In contrast, less skilled chess players showed a significant performance
decrement. Extending this research to the cyber domain, future research could compare
whether skilled cyber defense analysts maintain effectiveness given varying degrees of
time-constraints.
Because real-world cyber defense analysts must make rapid and accurate decisions
in order to not become inundated by the volume of alerts, imposing time constraints on
decision-making could identify when decisions become hampered by limited time.
Likewise, the number of alerts presented to operators is tunable based on the broadening
or constricting the signature base matching and heuristic settings of network alert sensors.
Flooding operators with alerts and requiring a set amount of decision actions to be taken
over a period of time could also affect the decision-making process, but this approach
would not align with the results featured from the competitive chess players study.
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2.4

Measuring Decision Confidence and Decision-Making
In order to be able to estimate decision confidence, operator behavior has to be

observed. Behavioral observation allows for passive analysis, which does not cause
interruptions such as those experienced when compiling self-reported measurements, or
the operator to don cumbersome equipment such as those needed for measuring
physiological signals. This research augments behavioral analysis with self-reporting by
participants and physiological measurements. The physiological measurements are
included as they benefit and enhance the behavioral observations, and because it allows a
mapping between the physical and mental parts of the body during decision-making. With
this combined understanding of the underlying decision-making process, the behavior
observation can then be the focus of monitoring and reacting, as this can be passively
observed with minimal evasiveness in a cyber-based environment.
2.4.1

Self-Assessment and Reporting
Survey-question based human analysis dominates psychological literature and the

vast majority of cyber effects studies involving human subjects [19]–[24]. Surveyquestions are reliant on various factors, including the subject’s experience and willingness
to honestly self-assess. The timing of the survey questions is the single most influential
variable in effecting the outcome. A subject’s perception is ever-changing during an
experiment, therefore the timing of a survey question could be heavily influenced by when
and how interruptive a question is. As discussed by He, et al., comparing and
understanding surveys for cross-study comparisons proved very difficult due to
inconsistent, confusing, or misunderstood measurements [25]. In this case, the research
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attempted to not only compare and group the various definitions used by each study, but
also the dimensions of the questioning, further supporting their argument that cross-study
comparisons were a difficult undertaking. Survey questioning should occur in distinct
phases during an experiment: pre-, intra-, and post-trial. Using surveys during only one or
two of these critical phases would bear insufficient holistic information, which is critical
in maintaining the consistency in the whole experiment allowing for normalizing of data,
and should ease identification of outliers or inconsistent users. Additionally, any result can
be questioned in a follow-up interview to further delineate and quantify the results [24].
Several assumptions must be presented. A Likert scale was chosen, as it provided
for a method to garner ordinal feedback from participants. Likert scales can be made in a
variety of different configurations, but the most common tend to be 5- or 7- point scales.
Questionnaires involving more than 5 options were seen as too difficult to accurately align
with, by participants. For instance, one study involved a 100-point Likert scale with 10
point increments, effectively making it a 10 option scale, but this was no more effective
than asking respondents to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 for how strongly they agreed or
disagreed with a presented choice [26], [27]. Likert scales are seen as a way of forcing a
choice on the responder, who may not have a definitive answer, but is forced to answer
anyway [28]. The NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) questionnaire format closely
resembles the Likert scale, although respondents are given the choice of making an inbetween measurement, such as a decimal value [29]. Additionally, emoticons were not
advised, but an example sentence or example situation for each option of the Likert scale
is strongly encouraged in order to help establish the scoring mindset in the responder [24].
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Humans are bad at self-assessment, mainly because of various biases which
contribute to the inability to objectively evaluate skill [30], [31]. Compeau and Higgins
postulated that extraneous factors may bias participant responses due to the nature of the
event being measured [32], [33]. Repeated questioning of the same information may lead
to fatigue, or disengagement, affecting the authenticity and validity of response.
Another limitation of survey-based questionnaires are the questions themselves.
The ordering of questions can have an effect on the outcome of later questions. Since the
training, and experiment conditions, and questions will be identical for all of the
participants ordering will not play a role when comparing across participants. A
demographic and computer-usage survey will be administered in order to determine if
frequent usage of computers in participant’s lives and job influenced their ability to
perform the cyber defense based task. The computer-usage survey will aid in identifying
trends, or the need for calibration when comparing reported confidence.
Another avenue of procuring self-assessments is through interviews. Interviews
allow for the assessor to focus on and examine qualitative features that a self-metered
survey will not accurately record. For example, the decision time and accuracy of a
decision can be examined, through questioning and ascertaining the exact reasoning for a
decision or behavior, if the responder is conscious of the action in question. Unlike the
survey methodology that will include questioning during pre-, intra-, and post-trial, the
interviews work best before and after the trials or the entire experiment. This allows for
minimal distraction, but requires the assessor to maintain notes or logs of the responder’s
actions so that they can be discussed by referencing if necessary. Structured interview
questions, concerned with analyzing the subject’s time, accuracy, and threshold for
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decision-making, leads to a better understanding of their capabilities and expertise [9],
[34], [35]. Unstructured, loosely controlled question and answer interviews can make it
difficult to conduct cross-study comparisons.
Assuming the structure of the interview can be repeatable across subjects, the
compatibility of the results during comparisons and tabulation should be straightforward.
Along with the survey information, the interviews will aid in stratifying and separating
situations in which the same values or ranks were provided. Since a five point Likert scale
is recommended for surveys, further granularity can only be achieved through
interviewing the responder about their answers and comparing trials. Typically, interviews
are seen as more favorable by participants, since they allow for more flexibility, compared
to the strict numerical representation of their answers in a survey-based questionnaire,
including the affordance to explain why or how a certain response is given. Observations
and logs will help allow the assessor and responder to share situation awareness of the
experiment, allowing for easy recall and play-by-play analysis of decision points and
junctions.
As was previously mentioned, consistency can be difficult to guarantee if the
structure and rigor of the interviews is not maintained. Additionally, only one interview
during each phase should be the limit, as continuous subject interviewing, similar to repeat
survey questioning, will lead to frustration and fatigue in the participant. Lastly, another
limitation is the timing of the interview. An interview following a trial or experiment
should be conducted as soon as possible, as to take advantage of the short-term memory of
the participant and to question decisions and actions while they are still fresh on the minds
of the participants.
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Since most of the benefits attributed to interviews can be contained in a survey
questionnaire constructed to allow the participant to rank order their selections during the
task and compare their decision based on groupings, an actual interview will be relegated
to future experiments whereby it is more feasible or practical to illicit feedback in this
manner.
2.4.2

Behavioral Analysis
Workflow and process observation are the crux of this experimental analysis.

Pfleeger identified the behavioral aspects of security, as the concept of leveraging what is
known about people and their perceptions in order to provide more effective security [9].
Behavioral science literature generally supports and demonstrates that recognition is
significantly easier than recall, possibly explaining why LTWM seemed to eclipse TTF in
experimentation [16]. Biases also play a significant influence in human behavior,
illustrated by the numerous constraints and assumptions imposed on this experiment in the
methodology section. The psychology behind these biases help explain why technological
enhancements may not always provide the expected result or effect.
By using both subjective and objective metrics, the state of the human can be
estimated. Human cognition is measured through physiological measurements, but
associating the subjective measurements taken from investigating alerts may allow for an
understanding of how decision confidence and decision-making affect each another.
Knowing what is taking place cognitively, by way of physiological measurements, and
associating this with the subjective correlation of the alerts, should allow for an
understanding of how decision confidence influences and determines the decision-making

24

process. With a greater understanding of the underlying mechanics of decision confidence,
the ability to provide near-real-time help for operators in low-confidence decision
situations is possible. Likewise, prioritizing the review of decisions made under low
confidence situations would allow for quality assurance mechanisms to aid in the
verification and checking of decisions made under subpar standards. Lastly, by feeding
this information back into training and the user interface design, the focus can be placed
on the areas and types of decisions most often associated with low confidence.
2.4.3

Physiological Measurements
Electrophysiological measurements are recorded by the observer and are non-self-

reported, objective measurements of brain, heart, and muscle activity as well as other body
states. Coupled with self-report based results taken from surveys, electrophysiological
measurements such as EEG and ECG provide a general observation of the physical and
mental actions taken by a participant [36], [37].
2.4.3.1 Electroencephalography
Lateral Intraparietal Cortex (LIP) neuron measurements have been shown to
represent the accumulation of evidence by subjects, leading to the formation of decisions
and degrees of certainty [36]. With an EEG measuring apparatus, brain activity can be
monitored during the evidence accumulation phase, through the decision-making phase,
and into post decision-making phases. This capability will augment our understanding of
the stresses experienced by participants. In addition, using the participant’s response
times, coupled with network traffic and cognitive workload, it becomes possible to
understand how decisions are formulated from the decision-making process.
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2.4.3.2 Electrocardiography
ECG will aid in identifying stress points or workload strains of the operator.
Biometric monitoring involving EEG and ECG enables human performance-based
attributes involving physical and mental manifestations of mobility and thought to be
coupled with mental self-assessments inherent in self-reported measurements in order to
support otherwise purely subjective-based measurements. Whereas surveys are a
subjective assessment by the human subject, the objectivity of the biometric
measurements is directly characterized by the subconscious mechanics of the human body.
Biometric measurement analysis may be coupled with the subjective measurements to
determine and characterize what is occurring in the mind and body of the human
participant.
2.4.3.3 Electrooculography
Lastly, measuring eye movement and fixation is another non-self-reported element
that monitors the subject’s visual field and to what degree they are attention-switching.
Visual recognition utilizes the same aforementioned LIP neurons in measuring the
formation of decision confidence and degrees of certainty [36]. Cyber defense analysts
and operators conduct a visually focused examination of Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
alerts, which involves recognition and memory recall. Attentiveness and situation
awareness require focused and directed responses to visual stimuli. Visual stimuli in
computer programs are typically presented to the user through graphical user interfaces.
These interfaces may lessen or enhance the burden of a user attempting to gain situation
awareness. Overloading operator cognitive resources causes performance decrement [38].
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This previous work investigated modifying trust in a cyber security tool, by increasing and
decreasing the accuracy and reliability of the tool. Tool accuracy was measured by how
much information was displayed about an alert. When the tool was more accurate the
screen was filled with more information, showing the user what was being detected and
acted upon, but this limited and inversely affected the performance of the human user in
charge of agreeing or disagreeing with the computers analysis. Applying this work to
confidence measurements, the focus on information that is pertinent and relevant to
making a decision may not always lead to the most appropriate or correct decision. Thus,
it is important to follow the process of information acquisition through the primary means
of information presentation in cyber defense, which is visually through an aggregator or
correlation platform that is fed alerts from IDS devices. Focus on a part of the screen and a
tool, is supporting evidence of fixation and may hint at a cue to action, prior to the
activation of the subject’s fine motor skills that are the result of some decision.
Eye-tracking may enable the measurement of tool usage, prioritization of
information, and other cognitive attributes related to identifying cyber investigative
workflow [27]. Coupled with mouse movements, graphical user interface window focus,
and keyboard input, eye-tracking provides insight into workflow, but not decision
confidence. This methodology shows what information was reviewed and for how long,
based on fixation, but with the assumption that the interface is simple enough in order to
differentiate between different graphic elements and windows.
One of the biggest limitations to eye-tracking data collection is that it is only valid
inside the context of the training environment, i.e. what can be measured from the user
looking at the computer screen and not outside the bounds of the computer screen [39].
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Additionally, as mentioned earlier, eye movements map to the participant’s accumulation
of evidence and leads to a decision. Thus, this is only another data point to use when
analyzing the behavior of the participant when conducting an investigation, which needs
to fit into the broader analysis for a holistic view of how and when an operator makes a
decision.
2.5

Conclusions
In summary, one of the biggest challenges evident from the literature review is the

need to augment the subjective, user-provided information from the survey comparisons
with the objective, physiological data. Bridging these two paradigms will provide a greater
understanding of the actions humans take when given information and constraints in
which to make a decision, as well as objective performance data. The biggest merit to
survey questionnaires is the relative ease in performing measurements, but their
consistency and validity can vary as the human participants become fatigued - because of
the duration of the task or because of frequent surveying - which can have a negative
effect on task attention. EEG, ECG, and other electrophysiological measurements are
novel approaches, extended from the medical and psychology domain, to review and
analyze reasoning and decision-making. Although they may prove to be impractical
outside of baseline tool configuration and workflow analysis, the operator’s decision
confidence expresses whether information presentation, user skillset, and physiological
effects have any measurable effect on job performance.
Past research has shown that humans are better at resolving ambiguity and
providing contextual mission relevant information to automated security systems, rather
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than handling large amounts of information and weeding out false alerts, which is not the
way humans are often employed in operational units [40]. Trusting the system through
accuracy, timeliness, and consistency, allows for human operators to focus their efforts on
review and analysis of ambiguous decisions. This may lead to benefits such an improved
culling of the seemingly endless alerts present in current cyber defense aggregation and
correlation platforms, and an improved prioritization of alerts and situations outside the
norm that cause operators to lack confidence in their assessments.
Finally, as was pointed out by the various biases, the design of the experiment and
the analysis of the participant data will need to be account for the effects of these biases,
as they would affect the findings. The biases which can be controlled will be identified in
the methodology chapter.
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III.

3.1

Methodology

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to establishing the research questions and outline how

the experiment will be carried out. The various factors and variables which will be
changed, as well as recorded for analysis will be defined. The makeup of the participants,
the required assumptions, and the analysis plan will also be covered in this chapter.
Additionally, the CIAT STE will be showcased, with examples and pictures of how the
tool was configured for the participants.
3.2

Background
Cyber defensive operations continue to be human-intensive activity. While many

researchers try to improve detection mechanisms, ultimately human operators will make
judgements about the correctness of the machine decisions and how to resolve the alerts.
Thus, research in the human component of decision-making during cyber analysis remains
vital. This experiment supports research which seeks to identify and characterize the
influences of decision confidence on information gathering and investigative processing as
it relates to the job of an Air Force Cyber Defense (ACD) Operator.
The study investigates decision-confidence relationships between self-reported
confidence, behavior, and psychophysiological signals collected when a participant makes
a decision – specifically in the domain of cybersecurity defense. By modeling the
relationships between self-reported confidence, physiological measurements, and observed
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data from operators conducting decisions on cyber network traffic samples, this study
investigates the relationships between behavior patterns and decision confidence.
The study determines the key attributes and behaviors, exhibited by cyber defense
operators, which affect the accuracy and decision confidence of cyber triage. Correlating
the self-reported confidence, physiological measurements, and observed behaviors
patterns from human subjects engaged in cyber triage of traffic samples should allow for
an understanding which can be represented by model and pattern analysis.
EEG, ECG, and EOG signals will be collected and used to determine what
techniques and behavior an operator uses to make a decision. Combined with decision
accuracy and self-reported confidence results taken from the alert presentation and
analysis software, electrophysiological measurements will provide another lens into of the
physical and mental actions taken by a participant in order to analyze the associated
behavior [1][2].
3.2.1

Research Questions
Using the cause and effect relationships for modeling decision confidence from

observing behavior patterns, recording self-assessed confidence, and measuring
physiological measurements, the goal is to identify factors which correlate with
confidence.
Investigative Question 1: What does the pattern of behavior, exhibited while
investigating an event, tell us about operator confidence in the formulation of a
decision?
Hypothesis: Investigative behavior has an effect on operator confidence.
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How a participant investigates an alert, identified through their pattern of
investigative behavior, indicates how confident they are in their decision. Behavioral cues,
such as repeat visits to certain tools or shorter time spent researching, may indicate a level
of confidence related to investigations handled in a similar manner. For this experiment
the operator will be asked to report their confidence after making each decision selection.
By identifying the patterns of behavior for each investigation, an estimation of operator
decision confidence can be inferred.
Investigative Question 2: What investigative and evidence collection techniques
does an operator use to make a decision?
Hypothesis: Differences in decision confidence will be evident in both patterns of
investigative behavior and differences in the operator’s electrophysiology.
Survey-question based human analysis dominates psychological literature and the
vast majority of cyber effects studies involving human subjects. In order to understand
how an investigation occurs, it is prudent to observe the behavioral and psychological
process, in order to identify patterns. An investigation workflow handout, see Appendix F,
will be given to each participant during both the training and experiment. Even with an
investigation workflow handout and the associated training day, participants may “cut
corners” or rely on tools more than others, which may affect the reported confidence.
These investigative behavior patterns will be used to determine when a cyber alert causes
the participant to change their behavior to overcome the difficulties of investigating a
more difficult alert.
Investigative Question 3: What are the behavior patterns associated with a
confident decision?
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Hypothesis: Operator behavior patterns associated with higher confidence will be
reflected in faster decision-making and quantifiable electrophysiological metrics.
The degree of confidence in a decision provides a probabilistic assessment of the
expected outcome. Higher confidence would assert that there is a higher probability of the
decision being correct. It is generally thought that certainty is informed by a neural
representation of evidence at the time of a decision [36]. Results have shown that decision
certainty was inversely correlated with reaction times and directly correlated with motion
strength, suggesting that speedy decisions are coincident with lower confidence [11]. The
time to a decision and the associated behaviors which led to the formulation of the
decision, are expected to have a ceiling or maximum set of actions which, being
quantifiable, would allow for comparing between decisions made with a higher reported
confidence.
Investigative Question 4: What are the behavior patterns associated with a correct
and confident decision?
Hypothesis: Operator behavior patterns associated with high confidence and
correct decision selection, will exhibit electrophysiological metrics which are
quantifiably different from decisions made in lower confidence.
Experience, a trust of the tools, an understanding of presented information, and
habitual work all play a role in improving the confidence of operators [41].
3.3

Experiment
Human subject performance studies on decision-making often rely on self-reported

mechanisms, such as surveys and interviews – and rarely involve interpreting confidence
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from physiological measurements and behavior during the decision-making process [13],
[21], [42]. This study intends to augment self-reported subjective results, by incorporating
both behavioral and physiological measurements. The combination of self-reported results
and physiological measurements will inform an understanding of decision-making
behavior patterns. Through understanding how self-reported results and physiology
correlate with behavior patterns, real-world operations could possibly be augmented by
only observing human behavior. Behavior can be directly observed and correlated to
decision confidence. Observing and analyzing human behavior is the only viable
measuring technique during actual real-world cyber defense operations, as self-reported
and physiological measuring would be impractical and cumbersome in environments
where cyber defenders operate.
Physiological measures included EEG, ECG, and EOG signals. These
measurements were recorded throughout the experiment with the intent to be mapped to
the behavior and self-reported results, in order to better understand what lead to decision
confidence in cyber defense operators.
3.3.1

Variables

3.3.1.1 Independent Variables
The independent variables, which will be manipulated during the experiment, are
listed in Table 1. The variability of the difficulty for the alerts will allow for identification
and correlation of purposeful low-confidence situations and situations where a higherconfidence should be achieved.
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Table 1: Independent Variable Summary
Control variable
Information Availability
(categorical)
Information Needed
(categorical)

Measurement precision
Amount of information in tools
Amount of tools needed to review

Information Inconsistency Amount of conflicting information
(categorical)
among tools

Proposed settings Predicted effects
Less availability =
[Low, High]
lower confidence
Less needed =
[Low, High]
higher confidence
[Low, High]

Less inconsistency =
higher confidence

Alert Difficulty was estimated based on the estimated information needed to make
the correct decision, availability of information, and the consistency of available
information. In order to create a consistent difficulty scale for the alerts, the three
difficulty variables were setup to identify perceived difficulty from changing the proposed
settings of low or high. Four levels of difficulty were created, in order to aid analysis.
The four types of difficulty include:
A.

EASY

B.

MEDIUM

C.

HARD

D.

VERY HARD

Eight possible alert situations were created using each combination of the three
factors. Figure 1 illustrates the difficulties based on each possible setting of independent
variables. The numerical values under each difficulty were determined by the subject
matter expert (SME). Higher numerical values indicated increasing difficulty. The four
difficulty levels were mapped to the six numerical scores.
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Figure 1: Alert Difficulty Breakdown

Using these six numerical scores, mapped to four difficulty levels, the independent
variables could be modified in different ways in order to facilitate creating robust alerts.
The proportion of the difficulties and number of alerts with false alarm or threat actions
were not provided to the participants during the experiment, in order to avoid any counting
or other related biases. Using the alert difficulty breakdown as a guideline for alert
creation, a total of 10 Easy, 8 Medium, 6 Hard, and 6 Very Hard alerts were populated
into the experiment database, and these correlated to 17 False Alarm and 13 Threat based
actions.
It is hypothesized that a variance in these difficulties will roughly correlate to
participant decision confidence – the more difficult an investigation, the less confidence
the participant should experience in their decision-making.
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Using the difficulty proportions, the 30 total alerts were randomly distributed into
each of the 5 rounds, see Table 2.
Table 2: 30 Alerts with Associated Difficulties
AlertID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Difficulty
AlertID
Easy
16
Easy
17
Hard
18
Very Hard
19
Hard
20
Easy
21
Easy
22
Hard
23
Easy
24
Easy
25
Medium
26
Very Hard
27
Medium
28
Easy
29
Easy
30

Difficulty
Easy
Very Hard
Medium
Very Hard
Medium
Medium
Very Hard
Easy
Hard
Medium
Medium
Medium
Very Hard
Hard
Hard

3.3.1.2 Response Variables
Decision confidence is the primary response variable in the experiment. The selfreported comparisons, which measure decision confidence, are assumed to be dependent
of the other choice the participants make, which is making a decision involving the
selection of either “False Alarm” or “Threat” for an alert. Coordinating the psychometric
data and the investigative process behavior will allow for each aspect of the experiment to
be replayed and analyzed, as it will be logged and recorded.
Psychophysiological signals will be captured and analyzed in future studies, as the
expertise of the experimenter does not support this analysis. The collection of
psychophysiological signals is presumed to correlate to accurate subjective decision37

making and decision confidence scoring. Alpha waves are associated with increases in
memory load [43], [44]. Gamma waves are associated with memory load, stimulus
novelty, attention, and reaction [45]–[48]. Theta waves are associated with decision
certainty and error prediction [49], [50]. The response variables, which will be recorded
and measured during the experiment, are listed in Table 3.
Table 3: Response Variable Summary

Response variable

Normal operating level
and range

Decision choice
[“False Alarm”, “Threat”]
(categorical)
Decision confidence
[“1”, “2”, “roughly the same”]
(categorical)
0‐131 Hz at
500 samples/sec
EEG (numerical)
0‐262 Hz at
1,000 samples/sec
ECG (numerical)
60‐100 beats per minute
Depends on age/sex
Mean = 17 blinks per minute
EOG (numerical)
Reading = 4.5 blinks per minute

Behavior

Ordering of tool use
(categorical)
Time per tool (categorical)
Time to decision (categorical)

Measurement precision
and accuracy

Relationship of response
variable to objective

Subjective

Correctness

Subjective

Relative confidence

Alpha – (9‐12 Hz)
Gamma – (30‐60 Hz)
0.7 µV RMS from 1‐50 Hz
Theta – (4‐8 Hz)
Low noise

Stress/workload

Movement, vestibule‐
0.7 µV RMS from 1‐50 Hz ocular reflex, blink rate,
and saccade

Subjective

The investigative process
identifies exploration
and/or techniques

3.3.1.3 Constant Factors
Table 4 shows the factors which will be constant for each run of the experiment. A
total of 30 alerts were chosen to fit the 2 hour time window of the experiment, as this is
the upper-bound generally assumed for electrophysiological experiments. A limit of 6
alerts per round was imposed limit in order to rely on the short-term memory of
participants for the greatest subjective scoring efficiency. The number of alerts used for
each difficulty will be as close to an even amount as possible, given 30 total alerts. The
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distribution of the alerts will be randomly distributed across the 5 rounds, and this
distribution will then be used for all participants during the experiment. The information
from each alert, including the ordering, will be identical for all participants.
Table 4: Constant Factors Summary
Factor

Desired experimental level

30 alerts

Participant reliance on short‐term
memory

How controlled?

Anticipated effects?
Minimizes
confusion/reliance on
5 rounds of 6 alerts
memory when
comparing

Number of alerts (by difficulty) Normal workflow

CIAT configuration None

Alert ordering

CIAT configuration None

Normal workflow

The 30 Alerts, made up of five rounds of six alerts, were chosen to maximize the
ability of the participants to quickly and reliably recall alerts, such that temporal ordering
could be extrapolated from comparing small groups of alerts to each other.
The Number of Alerts, including the four types of alert difficulty, were created by
a subject matter expert. The four levels are: Easy, Medium, Hard, And Very Hard. The
four levels of alert difficulty allowed for flexibility in alert creation and tool information.
Since the amount of alerts for each difficulty were withheld from the participant, they had
no way of relying on counting alerts per round or overall when carrying out their
investigation. Time to gain and analyze the information from the tools was hypothesized
to be the single most important factor in determining an alerts difficulty. The amount of
information available from each tool was modulated as part of the independent variables.
Alert Ordering is determined in pre-trial experimentation; the ordering was set to
the same for all participants. The ordering of the alerts is anticipated to cause no effects.

39

3.3.1.4 Data Collection and Analysis
Data collection was performed using CIAT, the associated CIAT logging database,
and the Cognionics system’s physiological output file. Each measurement was stored
during and after each participant’s trial, but calculations on the data was only done postexperiment. The analysis involved looking for overall trends in the participant population,
before analyzing the results from each participant individually.
3.3.1.5 Test Matrix
Table 5 shows the notional test matrix for the experiment. This matrix was
performed on each of the 11 participants. It should be stated that the threat and false alarm
distribution are not reflective of real-world alert distributions. The intent was to not cause
the participant to select a blanket decision choice, knowing that the real-world threat
amount is typically very low. Likewise, the alert difficulty distribution was intended to
present a range of possible difficulties so that the participant was forced into states of low
and high confidence, which can be used in mapping the behavioral data to the
electrophysiological data in future work.
Table 5: Test Matrix

Round
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2

Alert Difficulty
EASY
EASY
HARD
VERY HARD
HARD
EASY
EASY
HARD
EASY

Truth Choice/Confidence
THREAT
THREAT
FALSE ALARM
FALSE ALARM
THREAT
THREAT
FALSE ALARM
FALSE ALARM
THREAT
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Expected Time | Confidence
Short | High
Medium | High
Long | Medium
Long | Low
Short | Low
Medium | High
Medium | Medium
Medium | High
Medium | High

2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5

3.3.2

EASY
MEDIUM
VERY HARD
MEDIUM
EASY
EASY
EASY
VERY HARD
MEDIUM
VERY HARD
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
VERY HARD
EASY
HARD
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
MEDIUM
VERY HARD
HARD
HARD

FALSE ALARM
FALSE ALARM
FALSE ALARM
THREAT
THREAT
FALSE ALARM
THREAT
FALSE ALARM
FALSE ALARM
FALSE ALARM
FALSE ALARM
THREAT
FALSE ALARM
THREAT
FALSE ALARM
THREAT
THREAT
FALSE ALARM
FALSE ALARM
FALSE ALARM
THREAT

Medium | Low
Long | Medium
Long | Low
Medium | High
Short | High
Short | High
Short | High
Long | Low
Short | Medium
Medium | Medium
Short | Low
Short | High
Medium | Low
Medium | High
Medium | Low
Long | High
Medium | Medium
Long | Medium
Short | Low
Short | Medium
Medium | Low

Participants
For this study 11 participants, all male, were recruited, see Appendix A and

Appendix B. All participants in this study were voluntary military and government civilian
personnel. Participants were not compensated for their participation. The participant’s
ages were between 22 to 34 years, with a mean age of 26, and a median age of 25 (one
subject did not report demographic information). All participants had at a minimum a
Bachelor’s Degree, and used electronic devices in their job and on a daily basis in their
lives. Exclusion criteria included inability to use a mouse and keyboard, visual impairment
or inability to view information on a computer screen, and specific motor, perceptual, or
cognitive conditions which precluded them from operating a computer. Additionally,
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because participant electrophysiological data was to be collected, they consented to the
placement of electrodes on their head, face, and chest. Additionally, each participant’s
cyber security experience and whether they had earned any cybersecurity certifications,
were recorded. Participant’s consent was obtained prior to starting their participation in
the study.
3.3.3

Materials
The synthetic task environment used in this study was a modified version of the

Cyber Intruder Alert Testbed, also known as CIAT [23]. CIAT provided the underlying
features and capabilities, which enabled this research to benefit from a stable interface and
tested database system. CIAT, and the associated databases, were modified to reflect the
addition of EEG equipment, and to allow for tailored cyber alerts more relevant to the
experiments for this research.
For the experiment day, participants were asked to complete a pre-/postexperiment questionnaire. The pre-experiment questionnaire, see Appendix C, asked the
participant to account for their most recent amount of sleep and caffeine intake for future
correlation purposes. The post-experiment questionnaire, see Appendix D, asked the
participant to rate the difficulty of the cyber investigations on a Likert Scale, from 1 to 5.
Additionally, demographic information was requested, involving the participant’s
electronic device usage, electronic device usage in their job, whether they had
cybersecurity experience, their age, gender, and highest education level.
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3.3.3.1 CIAT 2.0
For the purposes of this research a modified version of CIAT, named CIAT 2.0,
was created. The changes are in three parts, one part focusing on the design of the
interface, the next part on the database and the alerts created, and the last part on the
program and databases interface with the EEG timing and sensor equipment. Henceforth
CIAT 2.0 will just be referred to as CIAT.
The task for the study was a computer-based investigation activity. During each
investigation, participants interact with the CIAT program through a computer interface
using mouse and keyboard. The CIAT interface provides a method for recording the
investigation steps the participant takes, and enables the participant to self-report decision
confidence on each investigation. EEG, ECG, and EOG signals was triggered by CIAT
and collected by the Cognionics Data Acquisition suite of tools, see 3.3.3.2 for more
information on how the EEG data is collected [1], [51].
3.3.3.1.1 Interface
The interface in CIAT was split three main windows: Baselining Questions, Alert
Screen, and Confidence Ranking. The Baselining Questions window was the first activity
presented to the user when they opened the CIAT program.
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Figure 2 : Baselining Questions Sample

Figure 2 shows an example baseline question, as it would appear for the user. The
user would then have to use their mouse to click on their answer choice. Throughout the
experiment, after a selection is made another window would appear, requesting the user
measure their associated confidence for their answer choice.
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Figure 3 : Determine Confidence Sample

The user would use the slider, as shown in Figure 3, to rate their decision
confidence on a scale of 0-100. Additionally, three subjective anchor words were used in
order to provide further separation when reporting decision confidence. Both the verbiage
and raw value, seen above the submit button, is visible for the user to rate their decision.
The Baselining Questions consisted of three examples during the Practice round, and
seven examples during the Experiment round. The Baselining Questions were the same for
all users. In addition to the number comparison shown in Figure 2, two more Baselining
Questions were asked.
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Figure 4 : Number-to-Car Baselining Question Sample

Figure 5 : Car-to-Car Baselining Question Sample

The second and third styles are shown, taken from the Practice round, in Figure 4
and Figure 5 respectively. Cars were selected in the baseline, as this required minimal
background knowledge to answer, and was something that all participants could safely be
assumed to see or interact with on a daily basis based on transportation norms in society.
Other possible baselining questions, such as arithmetic problems or history-based
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questions involving United States Presidents, were ultimately decided against because of
the possibility of involving other brain signals or memory recall which would have greatly
varied based on participant’s abilities outside of what was being measured.
The Alerts Screen was the main window the user would see, and where they would spend
the majority of their time with CIAT. Figure 6 shows a sample of alerts taken from the
Alert Screen during the Practice round. Appendix E labels the primary features of the
Alert Screen.

Figure 6 : Alerts Screen Sample

The Alerts Screen in CIAT displays the alerts at the top, in colors based on their
relative severity level, the tool selection in the middle, and an area for note taking and the
decision choices at the bottom. The severity levels are used to differentiate visually
between the alerts, and do not associate with the alert difficulty. The participants were
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briefed during the training day that the severity level did not relate to the intended
difficulty. With this setup, the user must directly select tools for results to be displayed.
This allows for recording of every aspect of the investigative process, while the user
researches and decides whether the alert is a Threat or False Alarm. Figure 7 demonstrate
what is expected of a participant while they investigate each alert.

Select an alert

Decide on
action for
alert activity

Read the data
from the alert

Investigate
the alert by
reviewing the
available tools

Write up
evidence and
justification

Figure 7: Generalized Workflow

Once the user completed a round of six alerts, the user is presented with a new
screen. The task for the alert confidence ranking screen, see Figure 8, is to move and sort
the alerts from most confident (on the top) to least confident (on the bottom), by reviewing
the notes the user submitted for each alert during their investigation. The alerts displayed
in the top box must be dragged and dropped, and rearranged, in the bottom box before
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submitting. This task acts as a quality control mechanism for the analysis. By having the
user verify the order of the alerts, without having the confidence scores they submitted
from the previous screen, they must rely on their short term memory and feelings when
ordering these alerts.

Figure 8: Alert Confidence Ranking

Once the user submits the alert confidence ranking, they will see the alert screen
again, Figure 6, but with new alerts. This will repeat for 5 rounds of alerts, for a total of 30
alerts during the experiment. For the practice, the participants were given 2 rounds of
alerts, for a total of 12 alerts.
3.3.3.1.2 Timing Database and Triggers
In order to track the behavior and investigative process of the users, mouse and
keyboard input was logged. This allowed for a play-by-play reconstruction of each user’s
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exploration through the tool, including the notes they typed, and the choices they made.
Coupled with each of these events were the triggers, which were time-synchronized with
the data generated by the EEG sensors. In total, there were 19 different timing events
generated by CIAT, which were logged in the timing database. These timing events
included items such as when forms were displayed, when a button was pressed, and when
decision choices were selected by the user. Coupled with this timing information were
triggers sent to the EEG measurement equipment, which provided each timing event to be
sliced and time synchronized, during post-processing analysis, with the database.
3.3.3.2 EEG / ECG / EOG Equipment
Participants interacted with the CIAT program running on a desktop machine in
the lab, which was configured to send trigger time sync data to the researcher’s laptop
computer in order to synchronize the recording of the collected electrophysiological data.
To collect EEG data, participants wore a dry electrode harness as shown in Figure 9.
Purchased from Cognionics, Inc., the Cognionics Mobile Series Headset was made up of a
harness capable of recording up to 72 channels. A total of 66 electrode channels were
recorded on the EEG cap, including the ground electrode. One electrode, located near the
neck behind the right ear, was used as a reference node. In addition, seven electrodes were
added as three additional channels, for 69 total channels, in order to capture the EOG and
ECG data. Six of these electrodes were set as pairs, one positive and one negative, and one
electrode was a shared ground. Two pairs of electrodes, one pair per channel, were used
for the EOG data, see Figure 10. One pair of electrodes was used for the ECG, which
included the ground on its channel, see Figure 11. These electrodes measured brain
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activity and sent signals to the laptop computer using a wireless Bluetooth connection
where the signals were recorded. The Cognionics Mobile Series Headset recorded at a rate
of 1000 samples per second. The Cognionics Data Acquisition suite of tools was used to
capture and process the EEG data into the Biosemi (.BDF) file format.

Figure 9: Cognionics Mobile Series Headset EEG Cap and Harness

The EOG electrodes were placed on four locations on the face, as shown in Figure
10, in order to measure the blink rate and direction of eye movement. A shared ground
electrode was used between the EOG and ECG.
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Figure 10: EOG Electrode Placement on Face

The ECG electrode placement, see Figure 11, shows where the two ECG
electrodes would be placed on the participant’s chest and also where the shared ground
would be placed.

Figure 11: ECG Electrode Placement
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Both the EOG and ECG data were collected as exterior (EXT) node measurements,
as they were connected to the Cognionics EEG cap through a Universal Serial Bus 3.0
(USB 3.0) Data AcQuisition Module (DAQ), which fed the information to the researcher’s
laptop wirelessly.
3.3.3.3 EEG – Cognionics Mobile-72 Wireless EEG System
The Cognionics Mobile Series Headset collects all of the EEG data from the
participant. The intent of collecting EEG measurements was to map the associated
behaviors of the participant during the alert investigations. CIAT recorded the windows
and tools that the participant used for each alert, as these were important for associating
events that led to changes in EEG measurements. Due to time constraints, EEG will be left
to future work.
3.3.3.4 ECG – Cognionics 1-channel + shared ground electrode
ECG measurements were associated with timestamps of the decision selections
(e.g. False Alarm or Threat). Similar to EEG measurements, ECG were used to measure
workload and stress as the participant conducts and validates their decisions [37]. ECG
analysis will be left to future work.
3.3.3.5 EOG – Cognionics 2-channel + shared ground electrode
EOG measurement analysis recorded blinks, saccades and visual fixation, which
are associated with levels of perception, concentration, awareness, and the learning and
training progress of learners [2], [52]. The intent of measuring eye movement, and the
associated dwell time, was to indicate levels of confusion or exploration by the participant.
Additionally, rapid eye movements indicate other factors such as graphic user interface
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frustration, which might affect decision-making and decision-confidence. EOG
recordings can be used to augment EEG-artifact cleaning process since eye muscle
movements are a large source of these artifacts. EOG analysis will be left to future work.
3.4

Assumptions
The following assumptions are made for this experiment:


The confidence of a decision is dependent on the decision-making process
up to the choice of the decision. It is assumed that in this experiment
structure, once a decision is made it cannot be changed.



The participants are not withholding information, and are willing to
honestly self-assess in their decision confidence, based on their decisionmaking.



The participants have not been told of the experiment or prepped, by
another participant, before participating in the experiment.

3.5

Procedures
The participant’s activities were split between two days of up to two hours on each

day. The first day included a familiarization lecture and hands-on training with the CIAT
program, as well as cyber security fundamentals. Training involved multiple participants
with one instructor, with class sizes between 2 and 4 participants. Four separate training
days were used to train 11 participants. The training day activities were conducted in a
classroom environment, with computers and a projector screen to present the training
lecture and demonstrate the CIAT program. The first task the participants practiced was
the decision confidence baseline, which involved three types of questions requiring the
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participant to pick the best answer from a set of two answer choices, see Section 3.3.3.1.1.
The intent of the decision confidence baseline was to use familiar concepts and example
questions to prepare the participant to understand how they must think about evaluating
their decision confidence.
The second task involved interface familiarization and a workflow walkthrough for
two alerts by the instructor. Each of the participants was given a general workflow process
as a handout, which was also available to them during the experiment, see Appendix F.
After these two alerts were completed, the participants were allowed to open the CIAT
program and follow along with one example while the instructor guided all participants.
After all of the participants had completed these three alerts as a class, three new alerts
were provided. The participants were instructed to work at their own pace, and on their
own, but they could seek help from the instructor. Once all the participants completed
these three alerts, the instructor reviewed these alerts and provided their notes and
confidence ratings as a comparison.
After the round of six alerts, a new screen was displayed in CIAT requiring the
participant to rank each respective alert based on the relative decision confidence to each
other alert. During each of these first six alerts, also referred to as the first round, the
instructor provided their own decision selection, decision confidence score, and their
associated case notes, which participants could read and ask questions about. After
familiarizing the participants with the decision confidence ranking task, the participants
were given the remaining time to complete six alerts at their own pace, but without any
discussion about the decision, the decision confidence score, or the case notes from the
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instructor. In total, the training day consisted of two rounds of six alerts, for the participant
to practice and understand their job and the task environment.
An individual 2-hour experiment block was scheduled for each participant. Only
one participant was scheduled during a 2-hour block. Each participant had to first
complete the training before being scheduled on a subsequent day for their experiment.
All experiment days occurred within two weeks of the day the participant completed
training.
In the experiment, the participant first completed a pre-experiment questionnaire,
see Appendix C. The pre-experiment questionnaire asked the participant to quantify and
qualify their sleep from the night before, and their level of alertness and ability to
complete the task.
Next the participant was prepped and configured with the EEG, EOG, and ECG
equipment before being asked to sit at a desk with the associated computer terminal
loaded with the CIAT software. Once the systems were checked for accurate readings, the
participant was allowed to begin the experiment by opening up the CIAT program. All
three tasks were identical to what the participant had seen and practiced on the training
day, albeit instead of 12 total alerts across 2 rounds, they were given 30 total alerts across
5 rounds. The partitioning of the alerts into 5 rounds of 6 alerts was intended to enable
participants to recall the previous 6 decisions they made so they could reflect on those
alerts during the decision-confidence ranking step. One by one, the participant would
investigate each alert and determine whether it was a false alarm or threat. Additionally,
the participant was required to input case notes justifying their reasoning for the decision
before submitting a decision. This justification would also aid them in recalling the
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information during the decision confidence comparison stage since the tools were not
available for review when they were tasked to perform the relative confidence comparison
between rounds. Because each alert investigation was estimated to take 2-3 minutes to
complete, a round of 6 alerts was expected to take up to 18 minutes to complete. Since the
equipment necessary to conduct the electrophysiological measurements, and the posture of
the participant, needed to be controlled during these sections, a pause between these
rounds allowed for a short break to adjust before proceeding. Between each of the rounds,
the participant was required to complete a decision confidence ranking.
Once the final alerts were investigated, and the final round was ordered by relative
confidence, the participant was asked to complete a post-experiment questionnaire, see
Appendix D. The post-experiment questionnaire asked the participant to rate how difficult
the cyber investigations were overall. Additionally, computer usage experience and
demographic information was surveyed in the questionnaire.
3.6

Analysis Strategy
All collected data was analyzed with python and statistics packages. Analysis

focused on the results of decision choice and decision confidence. The decision
confidence from participants was compared to the truth data, from an experienced analyst
(the baseline), which was correlated with the control factors to determine which changes
incurred the greatest effect on decision confidence.
First the baselining questions were reviewed, as they were important for EEG
analysis. The baseline questions, if calibrated correctly, would establish known distinct
difficulty levels which could be mapped to electrophysiological data. Since the difficulties
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are only ordinal, they would allow for a relative comparison between different states of
physiology the participant might be in. Similarly, the patterns of behavior associated with
baseline decision-making and alert decision-making could be reviewed for similarities,
although the tasks are wildly different. The baseline questions do not require an
investigation, and only rely on comparing numbers or car weights, therefore the
electrophysiology may prove more relevant than the behavior patterns. A rank comparison
will be done to validate that the difficulties were ordered as intended.
The expectations for the behavior pattern analysis involved reviewing and
analyzing the recorded data from CIAT. Time to decision, for example, could be an
indicator of confidence. Looking back at the Test Matrix, see Table 5, the expected
averaged results for the time to decide and the confidence level for the alerts in each round
based on the difficulty. The expected values acted as a hypothesis for the data analysis.
The choices made by participants, and the correctness, indicated whether alert difficulty
correctly aligned with our intended alert difficulty. Easy alerts were expected to have
almost 100% accuracy, whereas very hard alerts were expected to be of much lower
accuracy. A rank comparison will be done to validate the difficulties were ordered as
intended. Notional results were illustrated in Figure 12 and Figure 13.
Figure 12 illustrates a notional representation of the participant times per alert
difficulty. Data exploration, such as trend and correlation comparisons, enabled key
decision-making behaviors to be identified. The questionnaire data, concerning the
participant’s computer skill or general degree of confidence, was analyzed in order to
identify whether any correlation could be found with time to decision. It is hypothesized
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that participant’s with past experience and skills in cyber will perform better than those
participant’s without these skills.

Figure 12: (Notional) Time to Decision

Figure 13 charts the relative confidence of each of the difficulty tiers of alerts.
Grouping and clustering can be used to determine the general decision-making disposition
of individuals, in order to see who and possibly analyze why individuals responded
similarly.
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Figure 13: (Notional) Difficulty vs Decision Confidence

Other factors of analysis interest include tool usage trends, how long tools are
used, and how frequently tools are transitioned between. Analyzing these behaviors may
reveal exploration behavior, by the participant’s, which may associate with lower
confidence. For example, the participant may only need to consult one or a few tools in
order to make a decision, in cases of easier alert difficulty, whereas they may have to
spend more time and review tools countless times as the alert difficulty is increased.
Participant experience may play a part in understanding the behavioral differences,
associated with how investigations may differ between alert difficulties. Therefore a
general workflow guideline, for the participants to rely on, will be provided on both the
training and experiment days. The training day will focus on teaching the workflow
process in order to provide all participants a baseline level of knowledge for conducting
cyber based alert investigations.
Analysis of the electrophysiological data will be future work. A recommended
approach for the EEG data is applying the diffusion model. The diffusion model is a

60

model of the cognitive processes made during one- or two-choice decisions [53]. The
drift-diffusion model suggests participants will quickly decide upon an initial course of
action based on the available information, and use future stimuli to either further fortify or
contradict their decision [17], [53]. The correlation to the EEG measurements and the
process by which the participant comes to a decision, would provide insight into how the
participant’s behaviors influence decision-making. Likely graphs to be presented include
comparison-based and cluster-based overlay charts, to determine similarities among
participants when conducting investigative behavior which will be cross-correlated with
the tool and timing information collected from CIAT.
3.7

Summary
In summary, the methodology explained in this chapter establishes the foundation

for how the experiment was created and set the expectations for data collection. By
recording the behavioral data of participants, through the CIAT STE, this research allows
for analyzing how confidence is affected by patterns of investigative behavior. This
analysis strategy appropriately looks to review and calibrate the baseline questions and the
investigative cyber alerts, prior to doing any behavior comparisons among the participants.
After the difficulty is calibrated, data exploration will elaborate hypotheses which were
tested in order to answer the research questions for this paper.
The next chapter describes the analysis conducted on the compiled data. It became
evident in the early stages of the data analysis, that the initial difficulty classifications of
some of the alerts needed to be fixed and recalibrated. Section 4.2.2 explains why this was
needed, and how the alert difficulties were tuned after all of the participants had
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completed the experiment. Additionally, since the electrophysiological measurements
were reliant on finding expertise to conduct the analysis, the primary focus was on
identifying and creating a methodology which prioritized capturing behavioral metrics
from the CIAT tool independent of the external EEG equipment.
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IV.

4.1

Analysis and Results

Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the data exploration and analysis process

which led to the results. The investigative patterns of behavior for each participant were
explored. Each participant’s results were compared to each other, and to the population of
participants. Several identifiable behaviors were extracted from the data, and will be
analyzed in the results section. The results will also be highlighted in the conclusions of
Chapter V.
4.2

Behavioral and Subjective Analysis and Results
The initial analysis of the participant’s investigation activity involved plotting both

the accuracy and confidence scores against difficulty to determine whether the differences
in alert difficulty had the intended effect of causing variations in the confidence scores
when comparing alerts across the same participant or between participants.
4.2.1

Baseline Review
Reviewing the 7 baseline questions was done first in order to construct and

validate a data analysis process which would be scaled to the 30 alerts from the
experiment. These were made up of 4 Easy, 0 Medium, 2 Hard, and 1 Very Hard
questions. Figure 14 shows the plotted confidence values of all participants for the
baseline questions. The participant’s reported different confidences for each of the alert
types, but this needs to be validated by reviewing the rank correlation.
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Figure 14: Baseline Comparison of Confidence versus Difficulty

A ranking correlation comparison was done using the Mann-Whitney U test.
Comparing each of the questions’ estimated difficulty with the confidence of the
participants yielded statistically significant results, which correctly ordered the alerts by
what was intended. The average confidence of each alert difficulty among each participant
was input into the Mann-Whitney U test. The easy alerts were of a higher confidence
relative to the hard alerts, which was statistically significant (U-stat(11) = 3.973, p =
7.105x10^-5), where the alpha value (significance level) = 0.05. The positive value of the
U-stat means that the easy alerts were ordered higher than the hard alerts. This was
repeated for each combination of alerts, in order to determine a rank ordering of the
baseline alert difficulties with the reported confidence. For hard and very hard alerts, the
U-stat was significant (U-stat(11) = 2.791, p = 0.005258). Likewise, the results for the
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easy and very hard alerts were also significant (U-stat(11) = 3.973, p = 7.105x10^-5). This
confirms an ordering of the alert difficulties, from most to least confident, as easy > hard >
very hard. Note that there were no medium alerts in the baseline. These results meant the
calibration of the baseline alerts was correct.
A scatter plot comparing the difficulty of the baseline comparisons by difficulty
versus accuracy was created, see Figure 15. The clusters of accuracy for each of the alerts
was separated by 1 for correct, and 0 for not correct. A similar rank comparison was done
with the alerts based on accuracy.

Figure 15: Baseline Comparison of Accuracy versus Difficulty

Using the Mann-Whitney U test again, the accuracy of each alert was ranked and
compared for statistical significance. Using the same alpha value of 0.05, the only
significant ordering was easy and hard alerts (U-stat(11) = 2.397, p = 0.01654). Therefore,
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the only ordering which could be correlated from the accuracy was that the easy alerts had
a higher accuracy than the hard alerts.
The intent of the baseline was to familiarize the participant with how to answer
questions and select a confidence. All the behavior and scores during this simple task were
recorded, so that future calibration and analysis could be done when coupled with the
electrophysiological measurements. With a known and calibrated baseline, the
participant’s EEG results could be compared from their performance on the alerts.
Knowing that the difficulties were correctly ordered, by confidence, would also be useful
for identifying and comparing behavioral trends.
4.2.2

Alerts Review
During the compilation of the results for the 30 alerts and the initial review of

alerts, the SME raised concerns that alterations to the CIAT tools and database may have
led to some alerts being incorrectly calibrated. The goal for creating 30 alerts was to make
as close to an equal amount of alerts for each difficulty as possible. These 30 alerts were
originally calibrated such that 10 alerts were easy, 8 medium, 6 hard, and 6 very hard.
Table 6 shows the original breakdown of the 30 alerts by correct response and difficulty.
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Table 6: 30 Cyber Alerts for Experiment (Original Calibration)
AlertID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

CorrectResponse
Threat
Threat
FalseAlarm
FalseAlarm
Threat
Threat
FalseAlarm
FalseAlarm
Threat
FalseAlarm
FalseAlarm
FalseAlarm
Threat
Threat
FalseAlarm
Threat
FalseAlarm
FalseAlarm
FalseAlarm
FalseAlarm
Threat
FalseAlarm
Threat
FalseAlarm
Threat
Threat
FalseAlarm
FalseAlarm
FalseAlarm
Threat

Difficulty
Easy
Easy
Hard
Very Hard
Hard
Easy
Easy
Hard
Easy
Easy
Medium
Very Hard
Medium
Easy
Easy
Easy
Very Hard
Medium
Very Hard
Medium
Medium
Very Hard
Easy
Hard
Medium
Medium
Medium
Very Hard
Hard
Hard

During the construction of the CIAT tool and alert database, the self-imposed
limitation of 2 hours for participant experimentation trials, led to changes being
implemented for the tools. The information available in several tools and the alert
metadata were changed to minimize confusion by participants without cyber experience
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and also to target a per alert investigation time of 2-3 minutes, so that the experiment
could be conducted within the allotted time of 2 hours. All of the alerts were created by
one SME with several weapon system certifications and three years of experience on an
Air Force cyber defense weapon system. Since the computer experience and cyber skillset
of the participants varied between those with cyber security experience and certificates
and those without, it was important to calibrate the alerts in such a way as to allow anyone
with minimal training to be able to identify signs of good and bad cyber based network
activity. All participants were familiar with computer usage, and use computers on a daily
basis for their jobs and with their daily life, but investigating cyber alerts was a task the
majority of participants had not conducted prior to this study. Thus, confidence scores
were scrutinized based on the intended thresholds set by the difficulty. For example, very
low confidence scores on easy alerts and high confidence scores on very hard alerts were
suspect and reviewed first to identify whether the alerts created the intended difficulty.
The difficulty was set based on three main characteristics: information needed,
information available, and consistency of the information. Validating the intended
difficulty levels, such that the subjective confidence metrics were consistent across and
between participants was important for identifying the influence of behavior during the
investigations. Each difficulty category: easy, medium, hard, and very hard, was charted
relative to each participant’s accuracy, investigation time, and rated confidence score.
The initial review of these alerts suggested that the alerts were not calibrated to the
difficulty level intended. Thus, all alerts were reviewed again by the SME to determine if
any of the alerts had changed in difficulty due to changes to the initial quantity and
verbosity of the information available in the tools in CIAT. After reviewing all the
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experiment alerts, it was determined that a total of 19 alerts needed alterations such as a
correction to the difficulty score for 17 alerts and changes to the correct answer for 5
alerts. Any outliers identified in the scatter plots of the difficulty versus accuracy and
difficulty versus confidence were now attributed to consistency per participants. The
updated difficulty spread for these 30 alerts was updated to 11 easy, 6 medium, 9 hard,
and 4 very hard. Table 7 shows the updated correct responses and recalibrated difficulties
as the cells highlighted in yellow. Due to the recalibration, the amounts for the correct
responses were also changed from 17 False Alarms and 13 Threats, to 14 False Alarms
and 16 Threats.
Table 7: 30 Cyber Alerts for Experiment (Updated Calibration)
AlertID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Correct Response
Threat
Threat
False Alarm
False Alarm
Threat
Threat
False Alarm
Threat
Threat
False Alarm
False Alarm
Threat
Threat
Threat
False Alarm

Difficulty AlertID Correct Response
Easy
16 Threat
Easy
17 False Alarm
Hard
18 Threat
Very Hard
19 False Alarm
Hard
20 False Alarm
Easy
21 False Alarm
Medium
22 Threat
Hard
23 Threat
Hard
24 False Alarm
Easy
25 Threat
Medium
26 Threat
Very Hard
27 False Alarm
Easy
28 False Alarm
Medium
29 False Alarm
Hard
30 Threat

Difficulty
Very Hard
Hard
Easy
Very Hard
Medium
Easy
Medium
Medium
Hard
Hard
Easy
Hard
Easy
Easy
Easy

Using the newly recalibrated alerts, plots were created similar to the baseline
comparisons in order to continue data exploration. Figure 16 displays the confidence
versus difficulty of the original 30 alerts prior to recalibration. The same plots were
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generated for the 30 alerts as were generated for the baseline analysis. Figure 17 displays
the confidence versus difficulty plot of all 30 alerts after the recalibration took place.
Similar to the baseline comparison plots, the higher difficulties were illustrated by
confidence scores which were more spread out. The Easy difficulty, represented as 1,
showed the highest concentration in higher confidence scores.

Figure 16: Cyber Alert Comparison of Confidence versus Difficulty (Original Calibration)
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Figure 17: Cyber Alert Comparison of Confidence versus Difficulty (Updated Calibration)

The next task was to validate the intended difficulties of the alerts, as these were
the main instrument for affecting the confidence level of participants. A large spread of
confidence score is visible, see Figure 17, for each of the difficulties. Using the MannWhitney U test, the confidence of each alert was ranked and compared for statistical
significance. Using an alpha value of 0.05, the only significant ordering was between easy
and very hard alerts (U-stat(11,4) = 2.068, p = 0.03860). This means that only the easy and
very hard difficulties have a statistical significance, allowing for rank ordering.
Going through the same process as was done for the baseline, a rank comparison
test was completed. Again, the Mann-Whitney U test was used. Using an alpha value of
0.05, various orders were statistically significant. The easy and hard alerts (U-stat(11,9) =
2.594, p = 0.009493), easy and very hard alerts (U-stat(11,4) = 3.283, p = 0.001026),
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medium and very hard alerts (U-stat(6,4) = 2.791, p = 0.005258), and hard and very hard
alerts (U-stat(9,4) = 2.856, p = 0.004284) were all statistically significant with p values
greatly below 0.05. This means that the ordering of the alerts by accuracy, from most to
least accurate, is easy > medium > hard > very hard.
4.2.3

Data Exploration
During the initial data exploration, it was hypothesized that the ordering of tool

use, the time per tool, and the overall time to a decision would correlate to the differences
when comparing the confidence of each alert decision, per participant.
Data exploration into the ordering of tool usage was cursory and did not provide
for a sufficient way to readily compare within a participant or between participants. In
order to allow for time to explore the other hypotheses, tool order was skipped in the
hopes of being returned to later, when other trends had been identified which caused a
need to review the ordering of tool usage. Thus, the focus of data exploration moved to
reviewing the time per tool and frequency of tool use for alerts. The actual metric for time
per tool was calculated by looking at the time in each tool, given various other factors.
4.2.3.1 Analyzing Time-in-Tool
Figure 18 illustrates the total time spent in a tool, combined per each alert, to
showcase which tools the participant’s spent the most time. This metric was called the
time-in-tool. Each participant’s time-in-tool performance was compared to the reported
confidence scores, for identifying behavior trends.
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Figure 18: Time-in-Tool versus Participant (per Tool)
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For two participants, the time-in-tool metric was significant. There was a
significant effect for participant 1120: (F(1,28) = 4.869, p = 0.03571) and
participant 1121: (F(1,28) = 4.692, p = 0.03896), with an alpha value of 0.05. For
participant 1120 and 1121, the time spent in the tools was statistically significant for the
confidence of the alert. A decreasing trend line is readily apparent in Figure 19, showing
Confidence versus Time-in-Tool for Participant 1120. This trend line shows that tools are
used for shorter periods of time, when the participant expresses higher confidence.

Figure 19: Confidence vs Time-in-Tool – Participant 1120

For participant 1121, a decreasing trend line is evident in Figure 20, although it is
not as steep as Figure 19. The trend line shows that as confidence increases the time spent
in tools decreases, which is the similar case for participant 1120.
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Figure 20: Confidence vs Time-in-Tool – Participant 1121

For the other participants, there was no statistical difference in their time-in-tool
performance. Therefore further data exploration was necessary to find other patterns of
behaviors which could be used to estimate confidence.
4.2.3.2 Analyzing Time-to-Decision
Figure 21 was plotted to illustrate the relationship of difficulty with the time to
make a decision for each participant. Figure 21 seems to suggest that higher difficulty
does not necessarily map to longer decision times. The initial speculation for this
phenomenon was that Very Hard alerts may not have as much information readily
available for the participant, thus causing the investigation to be shorter relative to the
other difficulties.
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Figure 21: Time-to-Decision versus Participant (per Difficulty)

Alternatively, the relationship of time-to-decision and alert difficulty per
participant could have something to do with confidence, which is another comparison that
needing to be reviewed and interpreted. The trend lines in Figure 22 suggest that when
participants are rating alerts with a lower confidence they tend to take a longer time to
decide on their actions. The majority of the peaks in Figure 22 are Very Hard alerts, which
actually ends up refuting our initial speculation on Very Hard alerts tending to take less
time over all to decide on.
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Figure 22: Time-to-Decision versus Confidence (per Difficulty)

A one-way ANOVA was used to confirm whether the time-to-decision had a
statistically significant effect on reported confidence for participants. Six participants
showed statistical significance, and the results are displayed in Table 8.
Table 8: One-way ANOVA for Time-to-Decision Based on Confidence Scores

Participant #
1108
1109
1110
1114
1116
1121

alpha = 0.05 Fcrit = 4.20
df = 28
Time‐to‐Decision
F‐value
P‐value
4.922
0.03480
6.080
0.02006
8.981
0.005661
8.515
0.006871
35.74
0.000002
34.13
0.000003
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Data exploration continued to compare and contrast the results across all of the
participants, in order to identify if there was a generalization which could be made from
the time-to-decision and confidence. Looking at all participants in the experiment, see
Figure 23, there seems to be a downward trend overall in terms of time-to-decision
regardless of difficulty. A stabilization of the time-to-decision did not seem to occur, also
illustrating that the participants could become faster as they grow familiar with the task.
Overall, training effects are acknowledged, and attempts were made to mitigate them, such
as providing a training day and various alerts to practice investigating before the actual
experiment. Confounding variables such as the participant fatigue with the length and
rigor of the test, may need to be accounted for in future studies. The participant’s cyber
experience, which was expected to be a confounding variable, showed no effect on the
time to decision.
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Figure 23: Time to Decision versus Alert (per Difficulty)

4.2.3.3 Analyzing Transitions
The next phase of analysis involved creating and evaluating transition probability
matrices. Each transition probability matrix was constructed by summing the total amount
of tool uses, while keeping track of the last used tool. These transition values were then
graphically represented as heat maps. These heat maps visually illustrate the frequency of
tool transitions. The heat maps show the quantity of transitions from the tool identified in
the row to the tool identified in the column. The heat map does not identify which tool
was the first or last used in the workflow.
A heat map was generated for each participant, by each alert. The alerts were first
grouped by difficulties and reviewed. These heat maps were then reviewed across all
participants, based on difficulty of the alerts. The intent behind reviewing the tool
transitions was to determine whether the workflow process, printed on a sheet of paper
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and given to the participants during the experiment, was followed. The purpose of the
workflow was to aid all participants, especially those without any cyber alert knowledge
or experience.
Figure 24 shows how a strict adherence to the workflow would look like, assuming
the participant was already familiar with all of the terms in the glossary and did not need
to consult it. Figure 24 also assumes the participant would be starting from the Alert
Lookup tool, as is specified in the workflow handout, see Appendix F. The glossary was
removed from the strict heat map, as looking up a keyword or abbreviation could occur at
any time and would make a generalized workflow impossible to construct.
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Figure 24: Strict Workflow Tool Transitions

The strict workflow heat map provided a baseline by which to compare the
workflow process for all of the participants combined together, broken out by difficulty, or
broken out per participant and each specific round. A heat map combining the workflow
activity of all participants was created, see Figure 25. This provided a visible
representation of the workflow process conducted by each participant across all 30 alerts.
The darker colors represented heavier transitions from and to tools. The heaviest, and most
frequent, tool transitions were from Alert Lookup to PCap, Frame Info to PCap, and PCap
to Frame Info. Conversely, the lighter colors indicated less frequent tool transitions.
Transitions from the Glossary to Frame Info, Glossary to PCap, and Frame Info to
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Glossary were the least frequent transitions overall for participants, see Figure 25. This
combined heat map provided interest for observing tool transitions by counting each of the
tool transitions.

Figure 25: Combined Workflow of All Participants

It was determined that omitting the glossary uses made it easier to identify patterns
of tool usage, as the infrequent use would be because of the learning effect by which
participants are becoming more familiar with terms as they proceed in the experiment.
Even by including the glossary tool, in some heat map samples, it shows up as only a few
transitions. As the rounds progressed, and the participant completed more alerts, the usage
of the glossary tool dropped, along with one other tool. Tool transitions into the Network
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Info tool exhibited a noticeable drop, similar to the glossary, when looking at all of the
participants across the rounds. This could mean that the information in both the Glossary
and Network Info tools were becoming familiar to the participants. This explanation can
be reinforced by understanding the information available from the tools.
Five tools which were available to participants, three of the tools were static
information and two were dynamic. The two dynamic tools, i.e. changing the displayed
information with every alert, were the PCap and Frame Info tools. The three static tools
were Alert Lookup, Glossary, and Network Info. The Alert Lookup would be most likely
be required to be reviewed on every alert, in order to explain the definition of the alert,
whereas the Glossary and Network Info tools could be omitted in later alerts as the
information did not change and was able to be imparted in short term memory of the
participants, e.g. the learning effect.
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Figure 26: Participant 1108 Heat Maps by Round

The drop off of Glossary and Network Info usage was further confirmed when
reviewing all of the participant’s heat maps, based on the five rounds, although no
statistical significance calculations were done to confirm this. Figure 26 showcases the
first participant in the experiment, which highlights the drop in tool transitions to the
Glossary and Network Info tools as the rounds proceed. This result seemed to carry over
across all 11 participants, leading the future transition counts omitting transitions across
Glossary and Network Info tools, in order to account for the learning effect.
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Figure 27 shows the average tool use, across all participants, based on the
difficulty of the alert. Tool usage seemed to be the highest, on average, across participants
when looking at Very Hard alerts. Further analysis will be conducted on tool usage, in
relation to the time spent in tools, later on in analysis.

Frequency of Tool Usage
35
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HARD
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V. HARD

Figure 27: Frequency of Tool Usage by Amount of Alerts (per Difficulty)

4.2.3.4 Analyzing Tool Transition Counts
The next analysis effort was on tool transition counts and identifying whether they
related to changing difficulties and confidence. It was hypothesized that the frequency of
tool transition would correlate to lower or higher confidence levels in within-subject
comparisons, while not necessarily being broad enough to relate to between subject
comparisons. In Figure 28, transition counts trended upwards as difficulty increased for
participants: 1111, 1112, 1114, 1119, 1120, 1121, and 1122.
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Figure 28: Participant versus Average Tool Transition Count (per Difficulty)

For all but two participants, the transition counts for Hard alerts were the lowest.
Participant 1110’s lowest average transition count occurred with Very Hard alerts,
whereas Participant 1119’s lowest average transition count occurred with Easy alerts.
Both participant 1110 and 1119 had cyber security experience and cyber certifications, but
the four other participant’s with cyber security experience had the lowest transition counts
with Hard alerts like the majority of the participant population. Other confounding factors
may have played a role in the lower transition counts of Hard alerts, including the small
amount of Very Hard alerts. Accounting for learning effects by counterbalancing the
ordering of the alerts may explain this anomaly. Further analysis will be recommended in
future work.
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Table 9: Average Transition Count Based on Difficulty and Confidence Bins
Average Transition Count
Participant Difficulty CI (0,25] CI (25,50] CI (50,75] CI (75,100]
1108 Easy
2
3.81 N/A
2.94
1108 Medium N/A
N/A
2
4.13
1108 Hard
N/A
1.67
2.14
2.33
Very
1108
3 N/A
3.45 N/A
Hard
1109 Easy
5.18
4.07
3.36 N/A
1109 Medium
6.08
3.78
3
3
1109 Hard
2.78
2.67
3.23
2.25
Very
1109
4.22
3.91
2.25
1.6
Hard
1110 Easy
N/A
4.94
5.63
4.42
1110 Medium N/A
6.4 N/A
3.84
1110 Hard
7.3 N/A
N/A
3.83
Very
1110
N/A
N/A
N/A
4.63
Hard
1111 Easy
6.61
3.86
5.84
5.29
1111 Medium N/A
6.4
3.57
5.68
1111 Hard
3.57 N/A
2.83
4.17
Very
1111
N/A
6.78 N/A
5.45
Hard
1112 Easy
N/A
N/A
4.33
5.2
1112 Medium N/A
N/A
4.75
3.38
1112 Hard
N/A
4.18
3.71
3.44
Very
1112
N/A
6.09 N/A
3.27
Hard
1114 Easy
N/A
N/A
1.25
3.53
1114 Medium N/A
5.36 N/A
1.69
1114 Hard
N/A
4.62 N/A
2.67
Very
1114
N/A
3.57
5.45
3.1
Hard
1116 Easy
N/A
5.37
5.86
4
1116 Medium N/A
6.23 N/A
3.15
1116 Hard
N/A
3.89
3.19
2.87
Very
1116
5.47 N/A
N/A
3.37
Hard
1119 Easy
3.25 N/A
3.04
3.03
1119 Medium N/A
3.57
4.59
3.05
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1119 Hard
Very
1119
Hard
1120 Easy
1120 Medium
1120 Hard
Very
1120
Hard
1121 Easy
1121 Medium
1121 Hard
Very
1121
Hard
1122 Easy
1122 Medium
1122 Hard
Very
1122
Hard

N/A

2

N/A

3.47

N/A
N/A

2.33

3.73
3.8 N/A
1.33
2.55
4.24

N/A
1.2

2.2

N/A

2.33 N/A

N/A
N/A

3.88
3.7
3 N/A
5.12

N/A
N/A

3.17
4.89

3.39
3.35
2.88

N/A
N/A

5.43
4.33

7.06
7.39
4.69

4.58
2
3.87

7.3

6.46

5.79

N/A

N/A

4.65
3.25
1.96
5.07

5.46 N/A

4.8

3.14

Table 9 suggests that lower reported confidence mapped to higher transition
counts, for several participants. The table represents the transition counts, broken out
across bins of confidence scores, in order to illustrate the disparity in confidence scoring
for certain alert difficulties.
For five participants: 1109, 1110, 1114, 1116, and 1121, the transition counts were
statistically significant based on the confidence scores, see Table 10.
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Table 10: One-way ANOVA for Transition Count Based on Confidence Scores

Participant #
1109
1110
1114
1116
1121

alpha = 0.05 Fcrit = 4.20
df = 28
Transition Count
F‐value
P‐value
7.262
0.01177
17.38 0.000266
4.228
0.04918
7.092
0.01269
6.778
0.0146

The effect of transition counts on confidence, for each participant, respective of the
alert difficulty is displayed as Table 11.
Table 11: Transition Count and Confidence per Difficulty (by Participant)
Participant
1108
1108
1108
1108
1109
1109
1109
1109
1110
1110
1110
1110
1111
1111
1111
1111

Difficulty Tool Transition Count
Confidence
Easy
3.333333
68.14667
Medium
3.939394
85.06061
Hard
2.243243
84.81081
Very
3.346154
61.69231
Hard
Easy
3.979381
45
Medium
4.26087
42.47826
Hard
2.966102
44.25424
Very
3.242424
46.51515
Hard
Easy
4.818966
71.89655
Medium
5.447761
59.9403
Hard
5.2625
63.5125
Very
4.630435
88.1087
Hard
Easy
5.607692
68.91538
Medium
5.902778
62.875
Hard
3.888889
80.76389
Very
6.479167
53.95833
Hard
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1112 Easy
1112 Medium
1112 Hard
Very
1112
Hard
1114 Easy
1114 Medium
1114 Hard
Very
1114
Hard
1116 Easy
1116 Medium
1116 Hard
Very
1116
Hard
1119 Easy
1119 Medium
1119 Hard
Very
1119
Hard
1120 Easy
1120 Medium
1120 Hard
Very
1120
Hard
1121 Easy
1121 Medium
1121 Hard
Very
1121
Hard
1122 Easy
1122 Medium
1122 Hard
Very
1122
Hard
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5.108434
3.972973
3.662338

90.14458
85.32432
71.16883

5.372093

62.7907

3.380952
3.375
3.217391

92.63492
75.04167
78.17391

4.142857

74.53571

4.842105
4.5625
3.322034

77.42105
63.22917
65.11864

4.294118

51.5

3.056338
3.833333
3.246377

71.1831
71.64583
76.82609

3.648649

52.18919

4.303371
3.028571
2.666667

92.30337
92.14286
75.17647

4.588235

86.17647

3.424658
4
2.887097

85.27397
71.35417
81.67742

5.311475

34.7541

5.087302
5.823529
4.25

70.83333
58.72549
81.20238

6.473684

63.42105

4.3

Electrophysiological Analysis and Results
Preliminary analysis of the recorded EEG data was conducted to ensure all of the

channels were recorded through all of the participant’s trials. EEGLAB, the primary
MATLAB plugin used for analyzing EEG data, only showed a handful of channels upon
inspection. Further constraints, such as unfamiliarity with electrophysiological analysis,
led to the EEG results being compiled and cataloged but not analyzed. Therefore, this
analysis will end up being exclusively left to future work.
4.4

Summary
It was hypothesized at the beginning of this chapter that that ordering of tool use,

the time per tool, and the overall time to a decision would correlate to the differences
when comparing the confidence of each alert decision, per participant. The analysis and
results show, with statistical significance, that not only was time per tool, measured at
time-in-tool, important, but the time-to-decision and tool transition count were all
behaviors which affected reported confidence. Data exploration of the behavior data
extracted from CIAT allowed for seven of the eleven participants to have behaviors
mapped to their confidence. Four participants did not illicit a behavior pattern which could
be identified with the analysis methods covered above. In addition, the ordering of tool
use was not able to be validated with statistical significance, and is left to future work, see
more in Section 5.3.4.
With only 30 alerts available to analyze, a larger data set of participants and alerts
may lead to other factors becoming more relevant for identifying and mapping behavior to
confidence.
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The behaviors extrapolated from this research are specific to this synthetic task
environment, and would need to be generalized and applied to other tools in order to
expand the results across all cyber based investigations. Since this study only involved 11
participants it would be worthwhile to conduct an experiment with more participants, to
determine if these behaviors can be generalized given a larger sample size.
In summary, the behavioral and subjective analysis led to the observation and
statistical validation of three behavior factors which effect reported decision confidence.
Dependent on a larger sample size and analysis of the EEG measurements, the findings of
the behavioral analysis already allows for identifying behavior mechanics, specific to each
participant, which map to reported decision confidence.
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V.

5.1

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions of Research
The behavioral analysis of both the pool of participants and each participant

specifically, allowed for the identification of key behavioral factors, which correlated
with confidence. Table 12, displays a summary of the three behaviors analyzed in
Chapter 4. The statistical significance of the ANOVA results are explained in the
associated behavior analysis portions of Section 4.2.3. One participant’s confidence,
participant 1121, correlated with all three analyzed patterns of behavior. Additionally,
four participants, participant 1111, 1112, 1119, and 1122, exhibited no behavioral effects
on their confidence.
Table 12: Behaviors Which Effect Confidence

Participant #
1108
1109
1110
1111
1112
1114
1116
1119
1120
1121
1122

Behavioral Correlation with Confidence (as confidence increases)
Time‐in‐Tool Time‐to‐Decision
Transition Count
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
↓
↓
~

↓
↓
↓
~
~
↓
↓
~
~
↓
~

~
↓
↓
~
~
↓
↓
~
~
↓
~
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LEGEND
↑ Increased
↓ Decreased
~ No effect

The time-to-decision behavior influenced the confidence in six out of eleven
participants. Based on the results, no generalization of what effects of the tested
population can be made at this time, based on the analyzed behavior patterns.
This conclusion assumes that the overall understanding of how confidence and
behavior effect the formulation of a decision is correct. The alert difficulty was the factor
which was varied in the experiment. This led to behavior and an associated confidence,
which ultimately lead to a decision by the participant. The factors which effected behavior
were attributed to time, both in tool usage and overall decision time, and the transition
count among the available tools. Decision confidence was recorded after each decision
was made. With future electrophysiological analysis, the goal would be to determine what
specific behaviors correlate to increased or decreased confidence up to the point of a
decision being made.
Answering RQ1, the results of this study indicate that three key behavioral factors
correlated with participant confidence during the formulation of participant decisions.
These patterns of behavior were Time-in-Tool, Time-to-Decision, and tool Transition
Counts. Seven of the eleven participants in this study exhibited one or more of these
patterns of behavior.
Answering RQ2, the results showed that even when participants were given time to
practice and a workflow process to follow, they would deviate from the workflow
regardless of confidence. Future analysis will need to be completed, to determine whether
there is a statistical significance to workflow tool usage, as this could indicate reliance on
experience or familiarity with the tools and investigation. The captured EEG data may
reveal insight into behaviors associated with tool transitions and tool usage. Although five
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tools were available, the tools were not always reviewed in the same order or in the same
amount, providing further behavioral differences when compared to the reported
confidence levels during investigations. Statistical analysis will need to be completed in
order to make a conclusion about tool usage ordering.
Answering RQ3, the results show that behavior patterns correlated with increases
in decision confidence, but the converse needs be confirmed with further statistical
analysis. Namely, the next logical question is: what behavior patterns are associated with a
low confidence decision? Time-to-Decision decreased for participants who more confident
in their decisions, possibly brought about by not having to spend arduous amounts of time
repeatedly going over the same tools. Lower tool transition counts, and the associated time
in these tools, also mapped to higher reported confidence in several participants.
Participant 1121 exhibited all three behaviors with increased confidence.
Answering RQ4, the electrophysiological will be evaluated in future research, thus
any quantifiable differences in EEG metrics are unable to be confirmed at this time.
Notwithstanding the EEG analysis, to reiterate the findings from RQ3, three
distinct behaviors were observed to occur when participants were in lower confidence
situations. Likewise, the inverse of these results showcases that higher confidence
decisions tend to occur when decisions are made faster, relative to other alerts. The speed
to a decision, should not be taken as the only behavior though, as this could lead to
inaccuracy if purely looking at time, although this quantifiable measurements it the easiest
to compare within and between participants.
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5.2

Significance of Research
Thanks to the modularity of the CIAT STE, the additional features supported in

CIAT 2.0, will allow for future studies in behavioral analysis to be completed with simple
alterations to the dataset in the Microsoft Access database. Keeping with the modular
design of CIAT, CIAT 2.0 allows for rounds to be of varying alert amounts, and for the
addition or subtraction of tools for the users. Additionally, CIAT 2.0 enables EEG
collection, as it supports timing and signal forwarding to the Cognionics Data Acquisitions
suite of tools.
This study indicates that the investigative process in cyber defense, which
ultimately leads to a decision based on varying degrees of confidence inferred from tool
review and task understanding, requires further analysis to better understand how human
behavior may be measured and analyzed. Some behavioral assertions can be extrapolated
by only reviewing the workflow process or the self-reported metrics from simple
questionnaires, but the underlying physiological activity may provide a keener insight into
the degree to which data analysis and the investigative process effects the decision action
and the associated confidence in this decision.
The primary significance of this study was the collection of human participant
behavior, physiological data, and decision confidence from 11 participants, while they
investigated and decided dispositions for cyber alerts. With this data, further behavioral
analysis can be conducted, especially as it relates to physiological analysis, as no other
cyber defense studies have looked into the physiological data of participants.
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5.3

Recommendations for Future Research

5.3.1

Design Changes
Some design changes may be worth implementing in order to limit or eliminate

confounding variables. During data exploration and analysis, it became apparent that
several design decisions had created situations in which the participant’s transition
between the tools used during an investigation could not accurately account for their initial
tool selection. This was because completing the investigation for a previous alert, and
making a decision, did not reset the tool selection. The tool selection was left as the
previous alerts information, thus if the tool was the PCap or Frame Info, the participant
would already have new information displayed without having to manually request it by
selecting the tool. This had the possibility of skewing the actual tool transition statistics
toward less tool transitions. A remedy for this scenario would reset the entire tool
selection area of CIAT to be empty, whenever a new alert is selected, thus forcing the
participant to intentionally select their first tool each time they work on a new alert.
The structuring of six alerts per round in CIAT was intended to limit and balance
the amount of information presented to the participant at one time, while also separating
rounds by a consistent amount, given 30 total alerts and the experiment’s 2-hour time
limit. During the design of the synthetic task environment, the decision to display six
alerts per round was justified in order to give a manageable amount of workload requiring
the participant’s focus and attention, prior to a short built-in break. The decision
confidence ranking was structured as a validation of the previous decisions made during
the investigative phase of the experiment, since the numerical confidence values were not
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displayed for the participant. This prevented the participant from simply ordering the
numbers from largest to smallest, as well as forcing them to break any ties by arranging
the alerts in order from most confident to least confident per round. One simple design
change could be implemented in order to limit distractions. Since the alerts are all
designed to be self-contained and independent, the interface could be structured to only
display one alert at a time. This change, bundled with the reset of the tool selection would
force the participant to make each investigative decision without any prior set tool.
Additionally, this would prevent the participant from selecting an alert, reading some of
the information, and changing to another alert.
Another benefit of only displaying one alert at a time to the participant, would
allow for a restructuring of the alerts per participant. This would counter the learning
effect currently observed in the data, as each participant could be configured to see a
different preset ordering of the alerts. As mentioned previously, the investigation time did
not plateau or trend to a specific bound for any of the participants during the 30 alerts.
More alerts or a preset ordering of the alerts, could assist in determining the lower bound
of investigative time required to make a decision, as well as countering the learning
effect. Additionally, since the ordering of the alerts presented to the user would be
controlled, this would eliminate differences in investigation timing, better accounting for
possible confounding variables such as participant fatigue.
A recommended change to the ordering of the alerts, would help account for the
learning effect. By counterbalancing the presentation of the alerts to the participants, it
would become possible to review the alerts without having to look for a performance
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plateau. This would account for the learning effect or possible fatigue, which may explain
why the time to decision continued to decrease in general throughout the experiment.
5.3.2

EEG Analysis
Since this study’s analysis omitted EEG analysis, the data still needs to be

reviewed. Everything from clicks and timing to decision and accuracy may end up
providing additional behavioral factors which may validate whether the behaviors
extrapolated from the subjective and behavioral analysis were valid.
5.3.3

Participant Selection for Future Trials
The participant selection pool was greatly limited for this research. Not only were

all participants AFIT students or employees, but there were no female participants nor a
sizeable amount of participants with cyber backgrounds in cyber defense. Future studies
should extend the findings in this research by recording the behavior of those in the cyber
defense community with this expertise. The pool of participants could be broken into
groups based on time certified on cyber defense tools, and their level of computer or cyber
security certifications. Participation from an Air Force cyber defense unit would garner
additional insight into the types of tools and tasks which make up the investigative
process, especially based on tool usage frequency and the general workflow or process
dictated by the unit’s job. Ultimately, there may not be much of a discrepancy between the
efficiency or confidence of participants, when comparing those with cyber defense
expertise versus those without, due to the provided training and self-contained structure of
this experiment. This would validate the efficacy and usefulness of this synthetic task
environment, allowing for continued modifications and modularity to pinpoint what
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factors affect the decision confidence of operators. For example, complementary tools
may end up having a greater effect on investigation time, and therefore decision
confidence, if it requires the operator to frequently switch between tools. Distinct tools, on
the other hand, may make it easier to progress through an investigation in a workflow
style, thus increasing decision confidence or accuracy.
5.3.4

Other Data Analysis
Continued analysis of the tool transitions could possibly explain the time-in-tool

results. If statistical analysis is done for the tool transitions, it should also investigate the
originating and final tool used for each investigation. Analysis of the originating and final
tools used for an investigation was not investigated in this study.
Some tool pattern usage analysis was done, but no significant results were found,
in part due to difficulties in establishing a method for comparing the order of tool usage
per alert and per participants. One method for analyzing the transition probability matrices
is to conduct distance measurements between each alert and round for each participant.
Each tool transition count, made up of each source and destination tool pairing, can be
compared to other alerts by calculating the Euclidean distance. This matrix comparison
method was proposed, but due to time limitations it will be left as proposed future work.
5.3.5

Other Recommendations
Current systems exhibit either a machine-feeds-human or human-feeds-machine-

feeds-human style of network defense, for most if not all general computer interaction. An
example of machine-feeds-human can be illustrated by the relationship humans have with
IDS devices. These host and network IDS devices rely on humans to make the decision on
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information recorded, organized, and displayed to human users. Human-feeds-machinefeeds-human situations are those in which a host and network intrusion prevention system
(IPS) relies on the human feeding the machine rules and evaluation criteria, by which the
system takes action, although the human is available at any moment to modify the criteria
based on feedback. Knowing these limitations, the motivation for this research is to
improve trust and confidence with the systems human operate, by allowing the machine to
monitor the human and identify when the investigation process was compromised by poor
analysis behavior. This would allow a machine to augment the human in any computerfocused task, as long as there is a sufficient baselining or patterns of behavior to
extrapolate.
Monitoring and improving decision confidence enables consistent and expedited
effectiveness in those people training on these cyber defense tools, as well as the ability to
extend monitoring of decision confidence to quality assurance capability for those
currently operating on the tools. Decision confidence can lead to improved quality
assurance and work output, with minimal overhead, thanks to the computer agents that
assist in determining confidence metrics from tool usage, timing, and even the humans’
write-up. These three areas, quality assurance, training, and tool usage, can all be
measured using a subset of the methodologies illustrated above. Additionally, it would
make the most operational sense to task experienced human users, or team leads, as they
would be able to review or share in making the final decision on ambiguous or alerts
where low decision confidence is estimated. This research, due to its focus on human
efficacy, should apply to any cyber defense tool or process, as long as human-in-the-loop
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decisions are required, as their decision-making and decision-confidence will always play
a role in software.
5.4

Summary
In summary, this research fills an important gap in the literature regarding

understanding the decision confidence of cyber defense analysts by looking at behavior
patterns while they conduct investigations. The electrophysiological data may provide
additional insight into how cyber analyst’s behaviors may be influenced outside of what
can be recorded from a computer interface. The decision-making process relies on
confidence in the tools, but more heavily on the experience and understanding of the
analysts who carry out reviewing the data. The identified behavior patterns allow for an
estimation of decision confidence in regard to cyber based alert investigations. With an
understanding of the behavior and estimated confidence level of analysts, assistive tools
and techniques can be implemented to allow for quality assurance, tailored training, and
other enhancements for the cyber warfighter.
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